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ARTICLE
CONSENSUS AMONG MANY
VOICES:
ARTICULATING THE EUROPEAN
UNION'S POSITION
ON CLIMATE CHANGE
NUNO S. LACASTA, SURAJE DESSAI

& EVA POWROSLO*

I. INTRODUCTION
"We all recognize that climate change is one of the most
threatening issues that we are facing today ... We cannot negotiate with the Climate! We need to take action, now." Margot Wallstrom, European Commissioner for Environment!
"Europe is resolved to act and has mobilized to fight the
greenhouse effect." - Jacques Chirac, French President

• Nuno S. Lacasta is Senior Adviser for International Mfairs at the Portuguese
Ministry for the Environment, and Visiting Professor of Comparative Environmental
Law at the American University's Washington College of Law (WCUAU). At the time
of this writing he was European Of Counsel at the Center for International Environmental Law (CIEL-Washington, DC) and Senior Fellow for EURONATURA-Centre for
Environmental Policy and Sustainable Development (Lisbon, Portugal). He holds a
Bachelor of Laws degree from Lisbon University's Law School and a LL.M from
WCUAU. Suraje Dessai is a PhD candidate at the Tyndall Centre for Climate Change
Research, UK, and Associate Researcher with EURONATURA. He holds a degree in
Environmental Sciences from the University of East Anglia, UK. Eva Powroslo is a
lawyer in Germany. She holds a Bachelor of Laws degree from the University of Cologne and a LL.M from the School of Oriental and Mrican Studies, University of London, UK. She was a Law Fellow with CIEL in the fall of 2001. The authors would like
to thank Sebastian Oberthiir, Glenn Wiser, Paul KibeI, and Joao Gon<;alves for reviewing this article. Any errors or omissions are, however, the authors' full responsibility.
1 Speech by European Environment Commissioner, Margot Wallstriim, Environment European Climate Change Program: A Successful Approach to Combating Climate Change, ECCP Conference Brussels, 2 July 2001. Available at: http://www.europa.eu.inUrapidlstart/cgi/guesten.ksh?p_action.gettxt=gt&doc=SPEECHlO1l322I 0 I RA
PID&Ig=EN (visited Dec. 6, 2001).
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"... [C]limate change is already upon us. But it can get much
worse if we fail to act." - John Prescott, UK Deputy Prime
Minister
"The fight against the greenhouse [effect] cannot be delayed."
- Jiirgen Trittin, German Environment Minister

As the above statements2 from European leaders attest,
the issue of climate change ranks high on the continent's political agenda. In fact, the European Union (EU)3 and its Member
States have for over a decade claimed domestic and internationalleadership with regard to the challenge of global warming. 4 The EU has historically supported both the 1992 United
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
(UNFCCC),5 as well as its 1997 Kyoto Protocol. 6 After the
United States withdrawal from the latter in mid 2001,7 the EU
2 The last three statements presented were made in 2000 at Sixth Conference of the
Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC),
which took place in The Hague from November 13·25, 2000. See list of statements, in
U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/2000/5/Add.1, at 25·26. Available at: http://unfccc.int/rsource/cop6
.html (visited January 10, 2001).
3 The European Union (EU), established by the 1992 Treaty on European Union
(also known as Maastricht Treaty), available at <http://www.europa.eu.int/eurlexl
enltreaties/datleu30ns _treatY3n.pdf> (visited Dec. 11, 2001), consists of three pillars:
the European Communities (European Community [EC), European Coal and Steel
Community and European Atomic Energy Community); the Common Foreign and
Security Policy; and co·operation in home affairs and justice policy. Although the use
of terms may sometimes be incorrect as a strict legal matter (see for a detailed explana·
tion of this terminology Nigel Haigh, Climate Change Policies and Politics in the Euro·
pean Community, in POLITICS OF CLIMATE CHANGE: A EUROPEAN PERSPECTNE (Tim
O'Riordan & Jill Jager eds., 1996 [hereinafter O'RIORDAN & JAGER) 155-156 [hereinafter Haigh)), following common practice in the context of climate negotiations, the term
"EU" will be used consistently, without distinction as to which entity, the EU or the
EC, acts in the specific circumstances (cf. SEBASTIAN OBERTHUR & HERMANN E. OTT,
THE KYOTO PROTOCOL: INTERNATIONAL CLIMATE POLICY FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 14
(1999)[hereinafter OBERTHUR & OTT).
4 For an in-depth analysis of European leadership on climate change, see JOYETA
GUPTA AND MICHAEL GRUBB (EDS.) CLIMATE CHANGE AND EUROPEAN LEADERSHIP
(2000) [hereinafter GUPTA & GRUBB)).
6 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 9 May 1992, reprinted
in 31 I.L.M. 849 (1992), available at <http://www.unfccc.intlresource/conv/index.html>
(visited Dec. 10, 2001) [hereinafter UNFCCC or Convention).
6 Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change,
Conference of the Parties, 3rd Sess., Agenda Item 5, U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/19971
L.7/Add.l, adopted Dec. 10, 1997, opened for signature Mar. 16, 1998 available at
<http://www.unfccc.int Iresource/docs/convkplkpeng.pdf> (visited Dec. 10, 2001) [hereinafter Kyoto Protocol or Protocol).
7 See e.g. "Oh no, Kyoto," The Economist (Apr. 7, 2001). For a summary of initial
reactions to the U.S. withdrawal from Kyoto, see Gom,alo Cavalheiro & Nuno Lacasta,
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has continued to actively pursue the Protocol's ratification and
entry into force by the time of the World Summit on Sustainable Development in 2002.8 In fact, the ED and its Member
States have recently ratified the Protocol,9 Following is a brief
overview of the international climate regime lO since 1992 (see
table 1, below).l1

Table 1: Phases of EU Climate POli cy12
Phases
1988-1990
1990-1992
1992-1995
1995-1997
1997-Present

Milestone
Emergence of scientific concern
Negotiation of UNFCCC
Entry into force and First Conference of the Parties (COP-I)
Negotiation of Kyoto Protocol
Preparations for Protocol entry
into force and implementation

'1 Oppose the Kyoto Protocol": au Como se Deita um Acordo Internacional no Lixo!
Euronatura Working Paper 1/2001, April 2001, available at: www.euronatura.pt (visited Dec. 12, 2001).
8 See e.g. 2399th European Council of Environmental Ministers, Brussels, December
12-13, 2001, available at http://www.europa.eu.int/rapid/start Icgilguesten.ksh?p_ action.gettxt=gt&doc=PRES/01/459I 0 IRAPID&Ig=EN&display= (visited June 1, 2002).
9 See e.g. "EU Ratifies Global Warming Treaty: Kyoto Accord En Route to Becoming
Law Despite U.S. Rejection," The Washington Post, (June 1, 2002), at A15 [hereinafter
EU ratification).
10 We use in our analysis Krasner's definition of "regimes" as "Sets of implicit or
explicit principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures around which actors'
expectations converge in a given area of international relations." See INTERNATIONAL
REGIMES (Stephen D. Krasner, ed.), 1982, at. 186. For an application of the main
theories of international relations to the issue of climate change, see I. H. Rowlands,
Major theoretical approaches, in INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND GLOBAL CLIMATE
CHANGE (D. Sprinz D. and U. Luterbacher, eds.), 1996 [hereinafter SPRINZ &
LUTERBACHER), at 32-39.
11 See for reviews and analyses of the UNFCCC negotiation, IRVING M. MINTZER AND
J. AMBER LEONARD (EDS.), NEGOTIATING CLIMATE CHANGE: THE INSIDE STORY OF THE
RIO CONVENTION (1994); and Daniel Bodansky, The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change: A Commentary, 18 YALE J INTL L 451-558 (1993). For review and analyses of the Kyoto Protocol, see OBERTHUR & OTT, supra note 3;
MICHAEL GRUBB, CHRISTIAAN VROLIJK AND DUNCAN BRACK, THE KYOTO PROTOCOL: A
GUIDE AND ASSESSMENT (1999) [hereinafter GRUBB ET AL); Clare Breidenich et aI., The
Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 92 AM
J INTL L 315-326 (1998); and Nuno S. Lacasta and Pedro Martins Barata, Analise do
Protocolo de Quioto sobre Altera~iies Climaticas, 4-5 Rev. de D. Ambiente e Ordenamento do Territ6rio, 105-131 (Dec. 1999) [hereinafter Lacasta & Barata).
12 From Farhana Yamin, The Role of the EU in Climate Negotiations, in GUPTA &
GRUBB, supra note 4, at 48. [hereinafter Yamin). For a detailed account of the first
three phases ofEU climate policy, see Haigh, supra note 3, at 161-185.
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The Convention's ultimate objective is to "achieve stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a
level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference
with the climate system."13 In the face of mounting climate
science 14 and in recognizing that the UNFCCC was only a first
step in addressing the challenge of global warming, the international community decided to take on more stringent commitments and adopted the Kyoto Protocol in 1997. This landmark international agreement obliges developed countries and
economies in transition (Annex B Parties) to reduce their overall emissions of six greenhouse gases (GHGs)15 to "at least" five
percent 16 below 1990 levels during the 2008-2012 "commitment
period."17 In order to meet their commitments in an economically efficient manner, Parties can make use of market-based
instruments known as the Kyoto mechanisms (International
Emissions Trading, Joint Implementation and the Clean Development Mechanism).18 Parties can also choose to use toward their emission reduction commitments activities enhancing the ability of forests to store carbon (also known as land use
change and forest activities or "sinks").19 Such activities are
currently limited to afforestation, reforestation, and deforestation, although Article 3.4 leaves a door open for the inclusion of
other activities. 20
13 Article 2 UNFCCC, supra note 5.
14 See CLIMATE CHANGE 1995: THE SCIENCE OF CLIMATE CHANGE (J.T. Houghton et
al. Eds., 1996). This Second Assessment Report from the Intergovernmental Panel on
Climate Change (IPCC) (established in 1988), which has been elaborated with the
contribution from over 2000 scientists from all over the world, provided the scientific
foundation for the strengthening of the international response to climate change that
culminated in the adoption of the Kyoto Protocol. The IPCC has recently updated that
report after a third assessment. See also CLIMATE CHANGE 2001: THE SCIENTIFIC BASIS
(J.T. Houghton et al. Eds., 2001).
15 The six GHGs are carbon dioxide (COz), methane (CH4), nitrous oxide (NzO), hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs), perfluorocarbons (PFCs) and sulphur hexafluoride (SF6).
16 Emissions limitation or reduction are differentiated for each party: e.g. the EU
reduces by 8%, the U.S. by 7%, Japan by 6%, Russia and Ukraine stabilise, whereas
Australia increases by 8% and Iceland by 10%. See Kyoto Protocol, supra note 6, Annex B.
17 [d. Article 3
18 [d. Article 6, 12 and 17.
19 [d. Article 3.3 and 3.4.
20 Indeed, at the resumed Sixth Conference of the Parties to the UNFCCC (COP6.5), in mid 2001, Parties have agreed to also include as "sinks" activities those of cropland management, grazing land management and re-vegetation. In addition, and most
importantly, each Annex B Party was allocated a quantity of tons of carbon uptake it
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The Kyoto Conference raised the issue of climate change
into the arena of "high politics" with the involvement of inter
alia U.S. President Clinton, United Kingdom (UK) and Japan's
Prime Ministers Blair and Hashimoto and Germany's Chancellor Koh1. 21 The adoption of the Kyoto Protocol was seen as a
major success for international environmental cooperation,
even though it left myriad matters unfinished and nearly broke
down at some critical stages. 22 In November 1998, the Fourth
Conference of Parties (COP-4) 23 to the FCCC adopted the Buenos Aires Plan of Action (BAPA), an ambitious work program
on some of the key issues to be finalized by COP-B. 24 This
work program was, however, only finished at COP-7 in 2001,
after a collapse of the negotiations at COP-B in late 2000. 25 As
can account towards its emissions target from forest management activities. See Re·
port of the Conference of the Parties on its Sixth Session, United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change, Conference of the Parties. 6th Sess., U. N. Doc.
FCCC/CP/200115 (with two addenda) [hereinafter COP·6.5 Report]. At the Seventh
Conference of the Parties to the UNFCCC (COP· 7), in November 2001, Parties further
specified the operational rules with regard to the treatment of "sinks" under the Proto·
col. See Report of the Conference of the Parties on its Seventh Session, United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change, Conference of the Parties, 7th Sess., U.N.
Doc. UNFCCC/CP/2001113 (with four addenda» [hereinafter COP·7 Report]. Docu·
ments also available at: www.fccc.int(visitedOct.11. 2001). For an overview ofCOP·7,
including the provisions on "sinks," see Donald Goldberg & Katherine Silverthorne, The
Marrakech Accords, American Bar Association's Climate Change and Sustainable
Development Committee Newsletter, Vol. 5, No.2, January 2002, at 1·6 [hereinafter
"Goldberg & Silverthorne"].
21 See OBERTHUR & OTT, supra note 3.
22Id.
23 COP refers to "Conference of the Parties." Hereinafter, a numeral following the
acronym refers to the specific meeting, which have taken place annually since the
Convention entered into force in March 21, 1994 (U.N. Doc. FCCC/1995/Inf.3, at 1). The
convention's Parties have met for seven times since its adoption in 1992. COP·1 met in
Berlin in 1995 (see Report of COP·1, U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/1995/7 (with one adden·
dum)[hereinafter COP·1 Report]; COP·2 in Geneva in 1996 (see Report of COP·2 U.N.
Doc. FCCC/CPI1996/15 (with one addendum and one corrigendum» [hereinafter COP·2
Report]; COP·3 in Kyoto in 1997 (see Report of COP·3, U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/199717
(with one addendum and two corrigenda» [hereinafter COP·3 Report]; COP·4 in Bue·
nos Aires in 1998 (see COP·4 Report U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/1998/16 (with one adden·
dum» [hereinafter COP·4 Report]; COP·5 in Bonn in 1999 (FCCC/CP/1999/6 (with one
addendum)) [hereinafter COP·5 Report], COP·6 (which had two sessions in the Hague
in 2000 and in Bonn in 2001 (COP·6.5) (see COP·6 Report, U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/2000/5
(with four addenda, including 5 volumes to Add.3) and COP·6.5 Report, supra note 20.;
and COP·7 in Marrakech in 2001 (see COP·7 report, supra note 20). All documents
listed available at <http://www.unfccc.int> (visited Oct. 11,2001).
24 Those issues included the financial mechanism, technology transfer, adverse
effects, activities implemented jointly (AIJ) under the pilot phase, the Kyoto mecha·
nisms, the monitoring, reporting and verification rules and a compliance regime for the
Protocol. See Cop·4 Report, supra note 23.
25 See Suraje Dessai, Why did the Hague Climate Conference Fail?, 10 Environ·
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a result, Parties met at the resumed COP-6 (COP-6.5), already
without the U.S. as an active negotiating Party, and reached
agreement on a political package-the Bonn Agreement-on
the Protocol's operational rules. 26 This political agreement was
later complemented with legal texts-the Marrakech Accordsat COP-7 in late 2001. 27 These agreements have paved the way
for the ratification and entry into force of the Protocol, which is
expected in 2003.
This article attempts to provide an overview of key policy
elements of the European Union's climate policy since the
adoption of the UNFCCC in 1992 (see table 1 above). Section II
discusses the main features of the EU as an actor vis-a.-vis its
Member States and the international community at large. Section III identifies the key actors at play in the EU context; Section IV analyzes the ED's track record on domestic policies and
measures. Section V, in turn, debates selected key topics in the
international climate change negotiations from a EU perspective. Finally, section VI debates the prospects of continued international EU leadership on climate change, especially now
that the U.S. has withdrawn from the Kyoto Protocol.
II. THE EU AS AN INTERNATIONAL ACTOR
The EU is a sui generis international organization, which
has been referred to as a "supranational" organization. 28 Its
characteristics are new to international law in that it performs
certain functions that are traditionally within the realm of the
sovereign state. 29 Notably, it has the power to adopt law which
has "direct effect" in the Member States, an act of implementation by the states' authorities not being necessary.30
mental Politics 139·144 (2001).
26 See COP-6.5 Report; and Goldberg & Silverthorne, supra note 20.
27 See COP-7 Report, supra note 20.
28 HANS SMIT & PETER E. HERZOG, THE LAw OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, Vol. 1,
§ 1.02 (Publication 623, Release 40, July 2001).
29 Richard Macrory & Martin Hession, The European Community and Climate
Change, in O'RIORDAN & JAGER, supra note 3, at 106 [hereinafter Marcory & Hession).
30 PAUL CRAIG & GRAINNE DE BURCA, EU LAw 163-167 (1998) [hereinafter CRAIG &
DE BURCA). EC Treaty art. 249 (ex Article 189) (see infra note 31) lists the different
legal instruments that the EU has at its disposal: Regulations are binding in their
entirety and apply directly in all Member States. Directives are binding, as to the
result achieved, upon each Member State to which they are addressed. They leave the
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A. THE BASIS FOR COMMUNITY ACTION
The Treaty of the European Community (EC Treaty)31 does
not contain a single legal basis for Community action in the
area of climate change. Depending on the nature of the individual measures, they have been based on a variety of provisions, including, inter alia, Articles 71 (ex Article 75, Transport), 95 (ex Article 100a, Approximation of laws), 133 (ex Article 113, Common commercial policy), as well as on the Community's environmental competence32 as set out in Title XIX of
the EC Treaty, especially Article 174 (ex Article 130r). Its
paragraph 1 provides that community policy on the environment shall contribute to pursuit of the following objectives:
•

preserving, protecting and improving the quality of the
environment;

•

protecting human health;

•

prudent and rational utilization of natural resources;

•

promoting measures at international level to deal with
regional or worldwide environmental problems.

Paragraph 4 explicitly provides for international cooperation, inter alia through the conclusion of treaties with third
countries. Its fIrst subparagraph reads:
Within their respective spheres of competence, the Community and the Member States shall cooperate with third countries and with the competent international organizations.
choice of form and methods to the national authorities. Decisions are binding in their
entirety upon the addressees. Recommendations and opinions are not binding.
31 Treaty establishing the European Community (hereinafter EC Treaty) as
amended by the 1997 Treaty of Amsterdam, available at <http://www.europa.eu.intJeur
.lexfenltreaties/datJec30ns_treaty_en.pdf'> (visited Dec. 11, 2001). As the Treaty of
Amsterdam renumbered the articles of the EC Treaty, we will cite the old article in
parentheses. In late 2000, the Treaty of Nice amended the Amsterdam Treaty, but the
former has not yet entered into force. The Nice treaty has not nonetheless clarified the
questions addressed in this paper. We will therefore not take it into account in our
analysis. See, for an analysis of EU environmental policy after Nice, Andrew Jordan &
Jenny Fairbrass, European Union Environmental Policy after the Nice Summit, 10
ENVT'L POLITICS 109·114.
32 The word "competence" is used often by europeans in describing the mandate
and/or relationships between eu states and the commission, etc. However, the word is
not typically used that way in the U.S.
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The arrangements for Community cooperation may be the
subject of agreements between the Community and the third
parties concerned, which shall be negotiated and concluded in
accordance with Article 300.

Article 175 (ex Article 130s) determines the general procedure for the adoption of measures under Article 174, while Article 300 (ex Article 228) contains special rules for the conclusion of agreements according to Article 174 paragraph 4.
B. EXCLUSIVE VERSUS SHARED COMPETENCE

One of the features of the EU that most clearly distinguishes it from a state is the fact that the EU does not have
comprehensive competence. On the contrary, it has competency to the extent that Member States have granted it. 33
In a few areas, the Member States have decided that the
EU should be solely responsible for dealing with all issues that
may arise pertaining to that particular subject matter ("exclusive" competence). This is arguably the case, for example, of
the common commercial, agricultural and fisheries policies, 34
but not for the field of environmental policy. According to the
first paragraph of Article 174 (ex Article 130r), which determines the scope of the Community's environmental competence, the EU environmental policy only "contributes" to the
conservation and improvement of the environment. In addition, Article 176 EC Treaty (ex Article 130t) explicitly reserves
the Member States' right to adopt more stringent measures
than those adopted by the Community.35 This is a case of
"shared" or mixed competence between the Community and its
Member States. Both entities have the power to take action,
legislative and non-legislative, in the field of environmental
protection. The Member States can act insofar as the EU has
not done SO.36

'1

33 EC Treaty art. 5,
1 (ex Article 3b); CRAIG & DE BURCA, supra note 30, at 124.
Further, the Community has legal personality insofar as the Member States have
conferred competence on it. See EC Treaty art. 281 (ex Article 210), supra note 31;
P.J.G. KAPTEYN & P. VERLoREN VAN THEMAAT, INTRODUCTION TO THE LAw OF THE
EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES 97-101 (1998) [hereinafter KAPTEYN & VAN THEMAAT].
34 CRAIG & DE BliRCA, supra note 30, at 124-126.
35 Macrory & Hession, supra note 29. at 106, 123.
36 Agnethe Dahl, Competence and Subsidiarity, in GUPTA & GRUBB, supra note 4. at
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It is important to note that for areas of shared competence,
the EC Treaty contains a presumption that the Member States
rather than the Community should take necessary action. 37
According to the "subsidiarity" principle, the EU takes measures "only if and insofar as the objectives of the proposed action
cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States and can
therefore [... ] be better achieved by the Community."38 This
principle was introduced in 1987 for environmental regulation 39 and, since the adoption of the 1992 Maastricht Treaty, is
applicable as a general rule to all areas of shared competence.
Subsidiarity restricts the Community's scope of action in the
environmental field. The debate around subsidiarity has been
highly politicized, and as a result decisions on attribution of
competence have primarily been made for political and economic rather than environmental reasons. 40 In particular, the
subsidiarity principle has been used to impede the surrender of
further powers to the Community in the field of climate
change. 41
EU competence is particularly limited in the crucial energy
sector. In fact, the Treaties do not contain any formal Community competence in this field. Energy legislation has therefore
been based on the - exclusive - EU competence on internal
market issues,42 and attempts have been made to take energyrelated measures on the basis of EU environmental powers.
However, by invoking the subsidiarity principle, Member
States have frequently managed to retain their sovereignty in
all important areas. 43 As will be shown in detail below (Section
IV) , EU policy proposals in this field have frequently failed or
have been considerably weakened. For instance, some Member
States have, to date, successfully prevented the adoption of a
203,205 [hereinafter Dahl].
37Id. at 203,213.
38 EC Treaty art. 5 ~ 2 (ex Article 3b), supra note 31.
39 Former Article 130r (for explanation, see supra note 31).
40 Ute Collier, The EU and Climate Change Policy: the Struggle over Policy Competences, in CASES IN CLIMATE CHANGE POLICY 43, 48 (Ute Collier & Ragnar LOfstedt
eds., 1997 [hereinafter COLLIER & LOFSTEDT]) [hereinafter Collier].
41 See Collier, id at 43, 53-55; Dahl, supra note 36, at 203, 217; Haigh, supra note 3,
. at 165, 179; and IAN MANNERS, SUBSTANCE AND SYMBOLISM: AN ANATOMY OF
COOPERATION IN THE NEW EUROPE 74 (2000) [hereinafter MANNERS].
42 For an overview see Dahl, supra note 36, at 203, 208, and Collier, supra note 40,
at 43, 49, 50.
43 Id. at 43, 49; also Dahl, supra note 36, at 203, 209.
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Community-wide C02/energy tax, which the Commission first
suggested in 1991. Similarly, the European energy efficiency
program (SAVE)44 was considerably weakened as a direct result of Member States bringing the subsidiarity principle into
play.45 Agnethe Dahl, in analyzing the interplay between EC
competence and subsidiarity in the climate change arena, was
led to conclude that the subsidiarity principle has dominated
the evolution of ED climate policy.46
C. INTERNAL VERSUS EXTERNAL COMPETENCE

The internal competences of the ED are paralleled by external powers. Insofar as it is competent to promulgate regulation within the Community, the ED can also enter into negotiations and conclude treaties with other states and international
organizations. Because Community law preempts Member
State law, only the ED has the power to accept and implement
international obligations in areas of ED competence. Where
the Treaty does not provide explicitly for such external competences, they are therefore considered to be "implied powers."47
As stated above, Article 174, paragraph 4 (ex Article 130r) explicitly provides for an external Community competence in the
field of environmental policy.
As the external competence corresponds to the internal
powers, the split of competences described in the previous section also occurs in the external sphere. Article 174, paragraph
4 expresses this by referring to "[the EC and its Member
States] respective spheres of competence." This is the reason
why both the ED and its Member States are Parties to the
DNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol and they both need to ratify
these agreements.
The DNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol as well as other environmental treaties are what can be termed "mixed" agreements. They cover a variety of subject matters - including e.g.

See Section IV.X below.
See Collier, supra note 40, at 43, 55; Dahl, supra note 36, at 203, 216; and Haigh,
supra note 3, at 155, 166, 175, 179.
46 Dahl, supra note 36, at 203, 204.
47 CRAIG & DE BURCA, supra note 30, at 115·119; Macrory & Hession, supra note 29,
44

45

at 106, 123·125.
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environmental protection and trade, so that neither the ED nor
its members have the exclusive power to execute these accords. 48 In theory, only the ED is entitled to participate in negotiations concerning matters of exclusive Community competence, while the Member States are entitled to participate in
negotiations in areas of exclusive Member State competence.
Both are entitled to participate in fields of shared competence. 49 These areas cannot, however, be easily be delineated
from one another. This has at times caused the ED members
and institutions to enter into internal negotiations within the
context of external negotiations in order to decide who is competent regarding the issue under discussion. 50 On occasion, it
has even barred the ED from participating altogether. 51 This
has sometimes placed the ED at a disadvantage compared with
other actors. 52
Because the clear determination of respective competences
is virtually impossible, the Presidency of the Council speaks on
behalf of the Community and its Member States in climate negotiations, conveying agreed upon common positions. 53 Since
such common positions affect in part areas of Member State
competence, they must be approved by consensus. As a result,
the process of reaching agreement among all ED members and
the European Commission can be cumbersome, and can delay
necessary action and inhibit the ED's capability to demonstrate
leadership in international negotiations. In situations where
swift moves are indispensable, especially during the last hours
of decisive negotiations, the ED's negotiating ability can sometimes be paralyzed. 54 In addition, the outcome of these internal
negotiations is likely to reflect lowest common denominator

48 Joseph Jupille & James A. Caporaso, States, Agency, and Rules: The European
Union in Global Environmental Politics, in THE EUROPEAN UNION IN THE WORLD

COMMUNITY (Carolyn Rhodes ed., 1998 [hereinafter RHODES) 213, 218 [hereinafter
Jupille & Caporaso].
49 Macrory & Hession, supra note 29, at 106, 113, 136.
sOld. at 213, 218. See also Jupille & Caporaso, supra note 48, at 222, further note
on the UNFCCC negotiations that with the exception of areas of exclusive competence,
"the EC's authority was rarely clear to anyone, including the EC participants themselves."
51 Id. at 213,222.
S2Id. at 213,225.
53 Macrory & Hession, supra note 29, at 106, 136. See also Section III.D.1 below.
54 OBERTHUR & OTT, supra note 3, at 268; Hermann E. Ott, Climate change: an
important foreign policy issue, 77 INT'L AFF. 277, 285 (2001) [hereinafter Ott].
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positions even before the EU enters into bargaining with outside governments (see section VII, below).55
D. NEGOTIATING CLIMATE CHANGE: INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL
ORGANIZATION

1. Reaching a Common Position: The Council
Although the European Parliament's role has to some extent been strengthened by recent treaty reforms, the Council of
the European Union is still the most powerful EU body.56 The
Council is the ED's primary decision-making, legislative, and
coordinating authority. It consists of a representative at ministeriallevel of each Member State. 57 In the case of climate policy, the Council usually consists of the environment ministers.58 The members of the Council are bound by instructions
from their respective governments, but they are also obligated
- as parts of a Community institution - to act for the EU's
common good. 59
Decision-making procedures and Council voting rules vary
in different areas of EU competence. Most matters are now
decided by qualified majority voting. 6o In the field of environmental regulation, the procedure of co-decision between the
Council and the European Parliament, which provides for
qualified majority voting within the Council,61 is to be generally
applied. 62 Article 175 (ex Article 130s), paragraph 2, however,
contains important exceptions that apply when the Council
55 Joyeeta Gupta & Lasse Ringius, The EU's Climate Leadership: Reconciling Ambition and Reality, 1 INT'L ENVTL. AGREEMENTS 281 286 (2001) [hereinafter Gupta &
Ringius]; MANNERS, supra note 41, at 57-58; Bert Metz et aI., How Can the European
Union Contribute to a COP-6 Agreement?, 1 INT'L ENVTL. AGREEMENTS 167, 169 (2001)
[hereinafter Metz et all; Accord Jupille & Caporaso, supra note 48, at 213, 219, 226.
56 Mikael Skou Anderson & Lise Nordvig Rasmussen, The Making of Environmentl
Policy in the European Council, 36 J. OF COMMON MKT. STUDIES 585-97.
57 EC Treaty art. 202-210 (ex Articles 145-154), supra note 31; CRAIG & DE BURCA,
supra note 30, at 57-58.
58 Henry D. Jacoby & David M. Reiner, Getting climate policy on track after The
Hague, 77 INT'L AFF. 297, 300 (2001) [hereinafter Jacoby & Reiner].
59 KAPTEYN & VANTHEMAAT, supra note 33, at 187-188.
60 CRAIG & DE BURCA, supra note 30, at 130 (1998). EC Treaty art. 205 ~ 2 (ex Article 148), supra note 31, defines the qualified majority.
61 EC Treaty art. 251 (ex Article 189b), id.
62 EC Treaty art. 175, '1 1 (ex Article 130s), id.

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol32/iss4/2

12

Lacasta et al.: EU's Position on Climate Change

2002]

EU POSITION ON CLIMATE CHANGE

363

must act unanimously on matters primarily of a fiscal nature
and "measures significantly affecting a Member State's choice
between different energy sources and the general structure of
its energy supply."
In the context of climate negotiations, the Council plays a
key role both in the run-up to negotiations and in signing ana.
ratifying the relevant agreements. Before a negotiating session, the EU and its members meet in Council formation to discuss and agree on a common position. The fact that the Council was able at various stages of the climate negotiations to
reach agreement on specific internal climate policies, e.g. burden sharing among Member States, has both ensured a common EU line and strengthened the EU's leadership role during
those negotiations. 63 However, this leadership is sometimes
much less effective in the "heat" of complex international negotiations, in which a Party is expected to think and act quickly
(see section VII, below). The EU has often shown a lack of
flexibility and expedition; it clearly has an effectiveness gap in
international negotiations on areas of mixed competence like
climate change. 64
The process of reaching a common position within the
Council is characterized by bargaining and uncertainty until
the last moment. Success depends considerably on the leadership exerted by the country holding the Presidency65 at a given
moment, which in effect has to broker the deal among the other
Member States and the Commission. 66 Mter COP-1 (1995), an
Ad Hoc Group on Climate Change was established at Council
level. This EU coordinating group has enhanced the EU's effectiveness in reaching a common position. 67 The group is further divided into working groups (as many as half a dozen at
times) that analyze different negotiation proposals at a technical level with third Parties and prepare policy packages for
adoption by the Ad Hoc Group and the Council of ministers.
MANNERS, supra note 41, at 64.
Yamin, supra note 12; and GUPTA & GRUBB, supra note 4.
65 See infra Section II.D.2.
66 Historically, smaller Member States have been more prone to reaching consensus-and to a certain extent foregoing their strict national position in favor of an overall EU position. Thus has been clearly the case for Sweden and Belgium in recent
years. Bigger Member States, in contrast, tend to try to impose their own priorities, or
to broker agreement with other bigger states or influential smaller states.
67 OBERTHUR & OTT, supra note 3, at 65.
63
64
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Once an international agreement is reached, the Council is
responsible for signing and concluding the treaty or agreement. 68 Similar to the rules for internal decision-making, the
Council decides by a qualified majority. However, it must act
unanimously when the agreement covers a field for which unanimity is required for the adoption of internal rules. 69 There
have been arguments over the question of whether the second
paragraph of Article 175 EC Treaty (ex Article 130s), which
requires unanimity, applies to the conclusion of climate agreements. When the UNFCCC was adopted, the UK argued that
it did-in that climate policy affected significantly energy policies. The Council legal service, on the other hand, held that
Article 175, paragraph 1 governed and thus the qualified majority voting procedure applied. The problem was resolved politically when the UK abstained from voting. 70 The approval
process regarding the Kyoto Protocol,71 once again, addressed
this question. The Council faced intense discussions in reaching an agreement on ratification, because several Member
States, including the UK (and to a lesser extent France), argued for the necessity of unanimity. In order to settle the dispute, the Council adopted a declaration according to which further national obligations to reduce emissions should be decided
upon by consensus. It managed, however, to ratify the Kyoto
Protocol by under Article 175, paragraph 1 of the EC Treaty.72

2. Negotiating Internationally: The Role of Presidency
The Council is headed by the Presidency, which is held alternately by each Member State for six months. 73 The Presidency is assisted by the Commission and the Member States

EC Treaty art. 300 ~ 2 (ex Article 228), supra note 31.
EC Treaty art. 300 ~ 1, subparagraph 2, and ~ 2, subparagraph 1 (ex Article 228),
supra note 31.
70 Haigh, supra note 3, at 155, 178.
71 Commission Proposal for a Council Decision, COM(2001) 579, available at
<http://europa.eu.int/commlenvironmentlclimat/comlOI579_en.pdf>(visitedDec.11,
2001).
72 See 2413th European Council of Environmental Ministers, Brussels, Mar. 4, 2002
(provisional version). Available at: http://ue.eu.intlen/summ.htm (visited Mar. 5, 2002)
[hereinafter March 2002 Council].
73 EC Treaty art. 203 ~ 2 (ex Article 146), supra note 31.
68

69
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holding the preceding and the upcoming Presidency, these
three forming the traditional so-called "Troika."74
The Presidency coordinates the formation of the ED's
common position and presents it at international negotiations. 75 Its management of the process is vital for the effectiveness of the EU negotiating stance. The Presidency determines the agenda of the Council, chairs its sessions and coordinates the Member States at negotiations. 76 Thus, the effectiveness of the EU in international negotiations is influenced
by the Presidency's internal management and external negotiating skills and tactics. For example, in the run-up to Kyoto,
EU climate policy did not progress much during the Italian and
Irish Presidencies in 1996. While in the first half of 1997, the
Dutch Presidency drove the process forward significantly,
which resulted in the approval by the Council of the EU Burden Sharing Agreement, as well as a negotiating 15% reduction
target by 2010, and an intermediate 7.5% reduction target by
2005 (see infra, Section V.B.).77 Similarly, German leadership-and insistence-on the matter of using the Kyoto market
mechanisms as "supplemental to domestic actions,"78 ensured
that during its Presidency, in the fIrst half of 1999, the EU concluded and presented a negotiating proposal on this matter.79
In terms of negotiating with third parties, the Presidency's
leadership is also conditioned by practical and political considerations. For instance, two of the three Presidencies immedi74 After the Treaty of European Union and The Treaty of Amsterdam, supra note 3,
the Troika currently consists of the Presidency in office, the Secretary· General of the
Council, in his capacity as High Representative for the common foreign and security
policy, and the Member State which is next in line for the Presidency. In the climate
context, however, the practice has been to use the traditional rather than the current
Troika i.e. the Presidency in office, the Member State to hold the next Presidency and
the Commission. See Glossary, available at: http://www.europa.eu.intlscadplus/leg/
enlcig/g4000t.htm#t6 (visited Dec. 10, 2001).
75 OBERTHUR & OTT, supra note 3, at 14.
76 CRAIG & DE B(rnCA, supra note 30, at 58-59; OBERTHUR & OTT, supra note 3, at
66.
77 OBERTHUR & OTT, supra note 3, at 67.
78 Article 17 states that Parties' use of international emissions trading "shall be
supplemental to domestic actions for the purpose of meeting [the emissions targets)."
(Emphasis added.) This language was included upon the insistence of the EU. See
Joanna Depledge, Tracing the Origins of the Kyoto Protocol: an Article-by-Article Textual History U.N. Doc. FCCC/TP/2000/2 (2000) [hereinafter Depledge), at 83-85;
OBERTHUR & OTT, supra note 3, at 188-205. See also Section X, below.
79 See 2178th Council of Agriculture Ministers, Brussels May 17, 1999. Available at:
http://ue.eu.intlnewsroomlnewmain.asp?lang=1 (visited Dec. 12, 2001).
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ately before COP-7 (2001)-France and Belgium- adopted
considerably different coordination and negotiation practices,
perhaps reflecting the differences in capacities and posture between a large and a medium Member State. France, which
held the Presidency during the second semester of 2000, at
times 80 clearly pushed for what seemed like its own domestic
agenda in the internal EU coordination and watched the UK
unilaterally enter into tentative negotiations with the U.S.
aimed at securing agreement between the EU and the U.S.81
On the other hand, Belgium, which held the Presidency during
the second semester of 2001, took a more consensus-based approach internally and relied considerably on the assistance of
the European Commission (discussed below in Section IIIB) as
well as on a division of labor between Member States, especially at the technical level. 82
The rotation of the Presidency every six months in itself
presents a problem, because it has not allowed the ED's climate
policy to develop in a coherent and stable way,83 and has not
provided negotiating partners with a steady arrangement. 84
This is unlikely to change in the foreseeable future.
III. KEY ACTORS WITHIN THE EU
A. MEMBER STATUS

The EU currently consists of 15 Member States,85 the
greenhouse gas emissions patterns and energy mix and conEspecially during COP·6.
See Michael Grubb and Farhana Yamin, Climatic col/apse at The Hague: What
happened, why, and where do we go from here?, INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 77, 2 (2001),
at 263·264, available at: www.field.org.uk/papers/pdf/cop6.pdf (visited Apr. 12, 2002)
[hereinafter Grubb & Yamin]; and Ott, supra note 54, at 277.
82 Such a technical legal division of labor has, as a matter of fact, been commonplace
for quite some time, at least since 1995. It derives mainly from the extreme complexity
of the issues under negotiation (which include the setting of an elaborated set of rules
on a an international monitoring, reporting and verification regime for GHGs emis·
sions, as well as an international emissions trading system), a growing sense of team
work at the technical level, and also the fact that virtually every Presidency lacks the
capacity to tackle comprehensively and effectively such issues.
83 OBERTHUR & OTT, supra note 3, at 268; Ott, supra note 54, at 277, 285.
84 Ott, id., at 277, 285; cf. also Sebastian Oberthiir, The EU as an International
Actor: The Protection of the Ozone Layer, 37 J. OF COMMON MKT. STUDIES 641, 646
(1999) [hereinafter Oberthiir 1999).
85 Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy,
80
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sumption of which vary widely.86 The disparity in emission
characteristics, abatement costs, possible impacts of climate
change, and relative level of economic development in the different Member States presents a significant obstacle to agreement on a common climate policy,87 and to a certain extent provides an illustration of the climate change discussions at the
global level. 88 Thus the resulting variations in Member states'
willingness and capability to reduce emissions (see section V.B
below). In addition, Member States' readiness to endow the EU
with further competences varies widely, with the UK in particular being traditionally euro-skeptical in this regard. 89
Ian Manners, discussing the UNFCCC negotiations in the
early 1990s, divides the Member States into "lead states"
(mainly Germany, the Netherlands and Denmark-after 1995
joined by the new Member States Sweden and Finland),90 "support states" (primarily Italy and Belgium), "swing states"
(chiefly Spain, Ireland, Portugal and Greece), a "veto state," the
UK (which tended to position itself closer to the U.S. than to
the EU, although less so in recent years), and France shifting
from an initial status as a support state to one of a swing
state. 91 It is beyond the scope of this paper to illustrate comprehensively the positions of the fifteen Member States with
regard to the EU positioning on the climate negotiations. Suffice it to say, however, that countries strongly pursue their national interests at the EU level through Council meetings, and
at the international level through constant, tacit pressure on
the country holding the Presidency to uphold the collective EU
Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom.
86 For instance, with the exception of the UK, the EU as a whole and every EU
Member State are net importers of energy. GRUBB ET AL, supra note 11, at 30. For a
comprehensive review of Member States and Community's greenhouse gas emissions
and trends, see Commission of the European Communities, Report under Council [on
the] monitoring mechanism of Community greenhouse gas emissions, Nov. 30, 2001,
COM(2001) 708 Final.
87 Ute Collier, The EU and Climate Change Policy: the Struggle over Policy Compe·
tences, in CASES IN CLIMATE CHANGE POLICY 43, 44 (Ute Collier & Ragnar LOfstedt
eds., 1997).
88 GRUBB ET AL, supra, note 11, at 30.
89 CLIVE H. CHURCH & DAVID PHINNEMORE, EUROPEAN UNION AND EUROPEAN
COMMUNITY 49, 508 (1994).
90 These countries are those usually more sensitive to environmental issues in gen·
eral.
91 MANNERS, supra note 41, at 60-62. More recently, the UK has adopted positions
closer to the EU majority, id., at 76.
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position. 92 However, without the ED's collective "weight" individual Member States' interests might simply not be able to
prevail on the negotiating arena in the face of such sizable negotiating partners as the U.s., Japan, China or Brazil. In a
recent statement German Environment Minster Jiirgen Trittin
has illustrated this point quite effectively:
In such negotiations, Germany does not act as a nation state
and can only play an active role within the EU... I don't see
this as a loss of power of the nation state. On the contrary, as
far as environmental policy is concerned, it has been extraordinarily useful that the EU speaks with one voice and acts, at
global environmental conferences like Bonn or Marrakech, as
a strong nation state. This way, we have been able to continue the Kyoto Process despite the blockage by the United
States. 93

B. EUROPEAN COMMISSION

The European Commission (Commission) has been referred to as the motor of the Community94 and the guardian of
the treaties. 95 It performs a broad range of important functions, from elaborating legislative proposals to ensuring the
implementation of European law. It generally enjoys the exclusive right to initiate legislative procedures. 96 Unlike the
Council, the Commission does not consist of Member State officials, but of 20 independent individuals, one or two nationals of
92 EU negotiators often feel exasperated by the lack of leeway they are awarded in
negotiating the EU position. That is because they are essentially tied to the wording of
the most current Council conclusions, which are by definition starting positions. How·
ever, the internal EU dynamics at international climate meetings is less than prone to
rapid changes. That is essentially due to the fact that the EU has typically not fully
discussed bottom line positions before the start of the negotiations. It thus spends
most of the precious negotiation time discussing internally rather than trying to con·
vince other Parties of its own positions and trying to reach agreement. It comes therefore as no surprise to repeatedly observe Member States' representatives bickering in
the media, as was the case after COP-6 in 2000 (Grubb&Yamin, supra note 81, at 2634; and Ott, supra note 54, at. 277).
93 http://www.bmu.de/redenirede_trittinOl1208.php (visited Dec.17, 2001).
94 RUDOLF GEIGER, EG-VERTRAG Article 155/2 (1995).
95 For the role of the European Commission, see http://www.europa.eu.intlcommlrole
_en.htm#3 (visited Dec. 10, 2001).
96 EC Treaty art. 211, 249-252 (ex Articles 155, 189-189c), supra note 31. In the
field of environmental policy, this power flows from Articles 175, 251 EC Treaty (ex
Articles 130s, 189b), id.
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each Member State. 97 It takes decisions by a the majority of its
members.98
The Commission is organized in Directorates-General
(DGS),99 several of which playa significant role in climate policy (e.g. the DGs for environment, energy, taxation). Because
of their different functions and clientele-some DGs being
closer to business representatives and others to environmental
groupslOO_, agreement amongst them on climate policies has
not always been easy to reach, especially during the run up to
the UNFCCC negotiations. lol More recently, in the context of
the Commission's intra-service negotiation on a proposal for an
emissions trading directive, DGs Environment, Energy &
Transport and Enterprise were particularly active in brokering
an internal Commission deal.
In other environmental regimes, e.g. the ozone regime, the
Council has mandated the Commission to conduct the negotiations on behalf of the EU.102 Within the climate regime, however, Member States could not agree to follow the same procedure. The Council did not grant the Commission's request to
endow it with negotiating authorityl03 for the Kyoto Protocol
negotiations, because many members opposed transferring
more competences to the EU level,104 As described above,105 the
Presidency rather than the Commission fulfills the task of coordinating and presenting the EU position in climate negotiations. As a result, the Commission plays a limited role. 106 It
participates as equal partner in establishing the EU common
position, on which it and all Member States must agree. 107

97 EC Treaty art. 213 paras 1, 2 (ex Article 157), id; KAPTEYN & VAN THEMAAT, supra note 33, at 195-196.
98 EC Treaty art. 219 ~ 2 (ex Article 163), and Article 213, paragraphs 1 and 2 (ex
Arti~le 157), supra note 31.
99 For an overview of Commission's Directorates-General and Services, see generally
<http://www.europa.eu.inticommJdgs_en.htm> (visited Dec. 10,2001).
100 MANNERS, supra note 41, at 69-70,73.
101 Id. at 63-4 (2000).
102 Macrory & Hession, supra note 29, at 106, 112; for a detailed description of its
role in ozone negotiations see Oberthiir 1999, supra note 84, at 641, 645-646.
103 Such authorization of the Commission by a Council decision is provided for in EC
Treaty art. 300 ~ 1 (ex Article 228), supra note 31.
104 OBERTHUR & OTT, supra note 3, at 66.
105 See Section I1.D.2.
106 OBERTHUR & OTT, supra note 3, at 269.
107 Ott, supra note 54, at 277, 285.
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The refusal to grant the Commission a negotiating mandate has considerably weakened EU negotiating capacities. lOS
While in the ozone negotiations the Commission has facilitated
agreement among the Member States, the guidance of the EU
by the rotating Presidency does not provide a stable foundation
for the process and prevents the development of a medium or
long term negotiating strategy (see section VII, below),lo9

C. BUSINESS
The business community has taken an increasing interest
in the climate negotiations. 110 Early in the process, business
focused on fighting any restriction of fossil fuel use. The U.S.based Global Climate Coalition, a group of multinationals that
invested much money and efforts primarily in discrediting climate science, is a prominent example of early business activity
in the climate regime. 111
In Europe, the Commission's proposal for an energy tax
faced "some of the most ferocious lobbying"112 the EU had ever
experienced when it became clear that it would not be a "no
regrets" measure, as the EU had previously asserted. The well
organized business lobby, led by the Union of Industrial and
Employer's Confederations of Europe (UNICE), played a major
part in the inclusion of a "conditionality clause" in the energy
tax proposal, which ensured that the measure would not be
applied unless the major OECD competitors introduced similar
measures. 113
108 OBERTHlJR & OTT, supra note 3, at 66.
\09Id. at 286-269; Oberthiir 1999, supra note 84, at 641, 645-646; Ott, supra note 54,
at 277,285.
110 Chad Carpenter, Business, green groups and the media: the role of nongovernmental organizations in the climate change debate, 77 INT'L AFF., 313 314 (2001)
[hereinafter Carpenter].
111 Id. at 313 314; Clair Gough & Simon Shackley, The respectable politics of climate
change: the epistemic communities and NGOs, 77 INT'L AFF. 329, 334 (2001) [hereinafter Gough & Shackley].
112 The Economist, May 9, 1992, at 19.
113 Commission of the EC, Proposal for a Council Directive Introducing a Tax on
Carbon Dioxide Emissions and Energy, 30 June 1992, COM(92) 226 Final, at 4; (for a
general description of the evolution of EU policy from "no regrets" to conditionality in
this early phase see IAN MANNERS, supra note 41, at 42-9, 59-60, 63-4, 70; and Jorge
Wettestad, The complicated development of EU climate policy: lessons learnt, in GUBTA
& GRUBB, , supra note4, 25-45 [hereinafter Wettestad]. For current UNICE policy see
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Over time and with ever-increasing certainty in climate
science, the picture has become much more diverse. Many
businesses have now accepted the need for action. Some have
begun developing renewable energy and energy efficiency programs, set voluntary emission reduction targets and undertaken emission trades. 1l4 Mter British Petroleum withdrew
from the Global Climate Coalition,1l5 other companies followed
suit, and the Business Environmental Leadership Council was
founded in the run-up to Kyoto. This council accepts the scientific evidence of climate change and believes businesses should
playa major role in finding a solution. 1l6
More recent developments in Europe include the creation
of the European Business Council for a Sustainable Energy
Future (e5) in 1996, which is dedicated to sustainable development achieved primarily through energy efficiency, renewable
energy and sustainable housing and transport policies,117 and
the launch of e-mission 55 in the run-up to COP-6.5, in July
2001. E-mission 55 called for the adoption of meaningful political decisions by the COP and entry into force of the Kyoto
Protocol by 2002.1 18 Both groups have a substantial number of
European members.1l9
D. ENVIRONMENTAL NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS
Environmental non-governmental organizations (NGOs),
most of them organized in the global Climate Action Network

<http://www.unice.org>(visitedDec.11. 2001).
114 For a detailed account see Carpenter, supra note 110, at 313 314-319. See also
Gough & Shackley, supra note 111, at 329,334; Gupta & Ringius, supra note 55, at 281
286; WWF Climate Savers, available at <http://www.panda.org/climate/savers.cfm>
(visited Dec. 6, 2001).
116 The Global Climate Coalition closed down recently, possibly attesting to the fact
that it was rapidly losing membership. See Nature, Feb. 7, 2002, at 567.
116 Business Environmental Leadership Council, available at
<http://www.pew
climate.orglbelcl index.cfm> (visited Dec. 6, 2001); Gough & Shackley, supra note 111,
at 329,334.
117 e5: History, available at <http://www.e5.org/pages/energy.htm> (visited Dec. 6,
2001); The Sustainable Energy Charter , available at <http://www.e5.org/pages/sec
.htm> (visited Dec. 6, 2001).
118 e-mission 55, available at <http://www.solarworld.de/E-Mission-55/frame_indexle
_index.htm> (visited Dec. 10, 2001).
119 e5 Members 2001, available at
<http://www.e5.org/pages/comp.htm> (visited
Dec. 6, 2001); e-mission 55 Solution Site, available at <http://www.solarworld.de/EMission-55/solutions/e_home .htm> (visited Dec. 6,2001).
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(CAN),120 have played an important role in climate negotiations
from the outset. Their number has increased from 191 accredited observers at COP-1 in 1995 to over 530 at COP-6 in
2000,121 They have been participating in a number of ways,
including raising public awareness, e.g. through the media or
demonstrations; making presentations on specific topics in
side-events at the COPS;122 providing analyses, research papers
and comments;123 publishing ECO, CAN's newsletter on the
negotiating process;124 lobbying and discussing the issues with
negotiators; making formal interventions during negotiating
sessions; and assisting parties in drafting legal texts for
UNFCCC documents. 125
The role of NGOs in the climate arena differs from that in
many other fields, in that they have participated as partners in
developing the regime rather than simply playing the part of
outside critics. 126 NGOs are part of what has been described as
an "epistemic community," a network of communities that
share knowledge about a certain phenomenon and a common
set of normative beliefs concerning what actions will benefit
human welfare in this domain. 127 As in other fields, climate
NGOs reflect a heterogeneous universe of stakeholders, such as
generalist versus specialized/expert NGOs, membership versus
non-membership NGOs, etc.

120 See <http://www.climatenetwork.org> (visited Dec. 12, 2001). CAN has a global
membership of 20 Million people, PETER NEWELL, CLIMATE FOR CHANGE 128 (2000)
[hereinafter NEWELL).
121 Carpenter, supra note 110, at 313319.
122 For reports on some COP-7 side events see Earth Negotiations Bulletin - On the
Side, available at <http://www.iisd.callinkages/climate/cop7/enbots> (visited Dec. 12,
2001).
123 See e.g. Independent NGO Evaluation of National Plan for Climate Change Mitigation: Second Review, August 1994, Climate Action Network.
124 See Climate Network, available at <http://www.climatenetwork.org> (visited Dec.
12, 2001).
125 Carpenter, supra note 110, at 313 319-321; for an extensive overview over different NGOs see Gough & Shackley, supra note 111, at 329,336-339,341-345. For a portrayal of CAN see Matthias Duwe, The Climate Action Network: global civil society at
work?, 10 RECIEL 177-189 (2001) [hereinafter Duwe).
126 Gough & Shackley, supra note 111, at 329,329; similar MANNERS, supra note 41,
at 69.
127 Peter M. Haas, Epistemic Communities and the Dynamics of International Environmental Co-Operation, in REGIME THEORY AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 168, 179
(Volker Rittberger ed. with assistance of Peter Mayer 1993).
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In Europe, cooperation between governments and the
Commission and NGOs has been particularly close. Some government delegations even include experts originating from
NGOs, especially from expert/specialized NGOs,128 In addition,
Member States as well as the Commission have made frequent
use of the competence of NGO experts, e.g. by funding climaterelated research projects carried out by NGOsl29 and by discussing relevant issues with them outside and also during negotiations. 13o For instance, in preparing a proposal for an
emissions trading directive, the Commission relied on the expert advice of several European (and American) based NGOs.
In many areas, NGOs clearly possess advanced technical
knowledge which several EU delegations lack.
NGO presence varies in different EU countries. The number of NGOs listed in the 2000 CAN Directory ranges from two
(Spain) to nineteen (UK) in large Member States and from one
in Luxembourg to five in the Netherlands and seven in Belgium, the seat of many important EU institutions. 131 NGO influence has been heightened by the sensitivity to their demands from the part· of certain Member States. 132 For instance, it has been suggested that NGO opposition to the UKU.S. deal at COP-6, which among other elements included the
possibility of accounting "generous" amounts of carbon storage
activities for the U.S. and other countries, might have contributed to the decision of some EU countries to reject that deal,
notably Denmark and Germany.133
CAN Europe differs in certain respects from other CAN regionaloffices. While most CAN coordinators are employees of
regional NGOs and carry out their CAN functions alongside

128 See List of Participants, FCCC/CP/2000IlNF.2, available at <http://cop6.unfccc.
intlpdfllopcop6 .pdf> (visited Dec. 11, 2001).
129 E.g. Oberthiir 1999, supra note 84, at 641: see n. at 641; Jiirgen Lefevere &
Farhana Yamin, The EC as a Party to the FCCC/ KP: An examination of EC competence
(1999), available at <http://www.field.org.uk/papers/pdfl2%20ECcompetence.pdf> (visited Dec. 7, 2001).
130 On environmental NGO consultation by the Commission in general see John
McCormick, Environmental Policy and the European Union, in INTERNATIONAL
ORGANlZATIONS AND ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 37 (Robert v. Bartlett et al. eds. 1995
[hereinafter BARTLETT ET ALl) at 46-47. On the relationship between NGOs and some
European governments, see NEWELL, supra note 120, at 134.
131 CLIMATE ACTION NETWORK INTERNATIONAL NGO DIRECTORY 2000.
132 MANNERS, supra note 41, at 68.
133 Grubb&Yamin, supra note 81,at 263; and Ott, supra note 54, at 283-284.
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their regular work,134 and U.S.-CAN currently has one halftime staff member,135 CAN Europe currently has a permanent
staff of 7 people. 136 This is partly due to the fact that CAN
Europe receives government funding 137 - while U.S.-CAN relies
on foundation support -, as well as a practical reflection of the
fact that, in contrast to the heavy representation of NGOs in
Washington, D.C., the European NGO community had been
seriously underrepresented at the seat of EU power in Brussels. The greater number of staff members has enabled CAN
Europe to engage in substantive work much more than other
CAN offices, which cannot easily perform such tasks in addition to coordinating regional NGOs.1 38
Other than CAN Europe and a handful of staffers from the
big international NGOs located in Brussels or nearby, European NGOs are primarily located in the different European
countries. The local versus regional interaction in Europe constitutes the backbone of NGO activity there. In that sense, a
strong local presence-in addition to a limited but targeted coordinating presence in Brussels- has over the years contributed to a high level of NGO pressure in Europe and, arguably,
higher overall effectiveness 139 when compared to other regional
CAN activities. 140

Duwe, supra note 125, at 177.
Personal interview with Joanna Krinn, U.S.-CAN (Dec. 11,2001).
136 Staff, available at <http://www.climnet.org> (visited Mar. 5, 2002).
137 It is not uncommon in Europe for NGOs to receive partial financial support from
public authorities including the State. This is partly due to the fact that, unlike in the
U.S., private foundations are less predominant in Europe, and the State has traditionally a bigger role-including a fmancial role-in society in general.
13B Personal interview with Joanna Krinn, U.S.-CAN (Dec. 11, 2001).
CNE staff
includes energy specialists and a climate policy researcher, CNE Staff, available at
<http://www.climnet.org>(visitedDec.11. 2001).
139 See also Axel Michaelowa, Impact of Interest Groups on EU Climate Policy, 8
European Environment 152-160 (1998). A recent poll confirmed a trend that "Europeans continue to trust NGOs twice as much as government and substantially more than
corporations or the media." See Edelman PR Worldwide, Second annual survey of U.S.
and European Opinion Leaders (on file with authors).
140 Comparing briefly CAN Europe with U.S.-CAN, the latter has focused primarily
on coordinating those NGOs with offices in Washington, D.C. As a result, there is a
high level of coordination-and arguably effectiveness-of NGO activity in the U.S.
capital (Personal interview with Joanna Krinn, U.S.-CAN (Dec. 11, 2001), which is
primarily aimed at the Federal Government.
134

135
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E. MEDIA AND PUBLIC
Public attention plays a central role in determining the
EU's political agenda. High levels of public concern about environmental problems have repeatedly prompted governments
to address them, while in the absence of popular interest, they
are considerably less likely to take action. Arguably, both the
conclusion of the UNFCCC in time for the Rio Summit in 1992
and of the Kyoto Protocol were to a large degree the result of
substantial public pressure. 141
However, the attitude of the public towards environmental
policies varies in different EU Member States. It is an important element that has influenced the positions individual states
have adopted in environmental matters in general and climate
policies in particular. 142 The strength of the Green movement,
which in the 1990s, for example, was strong in Germany and
rather weak in France, can serve to some extent as an indicator
of public opinion, and success of a Green Party in elections has
at times caused a government to change its position.1 43
Public opinion is largely influenced by the media. Media
coverage directs the public's attention to certain issues and
consequently has a bearing on the government agenda. Since
the media is the primary source of information on climate
change for most people, it also shapes the way they perceive
the problem and possible solutions. 144
In recent years, major media sources have reported on
various aspects of climate change on a very regular basis.1 45
Large numbers of journalists attend the COPs; almost 1,000
were accredited at COP-6 (2000) in The Hague in comparison
to little more than 2,000 members of Party delegations. 146
NEWELL, supra note 120, at 70-1, 76, 85-6.
MANNERS, supra note 41, at 70-l.
143 See NEWELL, supra note 120, at 70 for acid rain; and Oberthiir 1999, supra note
84, at 641,648-650 for ozone politics, both referring to Germany.
144 NEWELL, supra note 120, at 71-72; Priya A. Kurian, The U.S. Congress and the
World Banks, in BARTLETI' ET AL, supra note 130, at 103, 106-107
145 Carpenter, supra note 110, at 313, 321-5. Lists of recent reports are available
e.g. in the IISD's bi-weekly news summary "Climate News", available at
<http://www.cckn.netlclimate_ news.asp> (visited Dec. 12, 2001), and - with a more
European focus - on the CNE website, available at <http://www.climnet.org/newsl
news.htm> (visited Dec. 12, 2001).
146 List of Participants, FCCC/CP/2000IINF.2, www.unfccc.int(visitedDec.11.
2001).
141

142
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Since COP-3 (1997), newspaper articles have been posted and
distributed at the conference center and handed to government
officials,147 providing negotiators with an immediate public
feedback. On the other hand, media interest fades in the time
periods between major conferences,148 and the way reporters
have presented the subject has in certain respects added to confusion and lack of knowledge concerning important aspects of
climate change. Factual errors, an overemphasis of the findings of skeptical climate scientists, exaggeration of abatement
costs and a focus on singular extreme events rather than structural problems have resulted in widespread misunderstandings
about the science, the causes of climate change and possible
responses.1 49 This applies to European as well as U.S. media. 150
IV. DOES THE EU HAVE A DOMESTIC CLIMATE CHANGE POLICY?
151

A. POLICIES AND MEASURES AT THE EU LEVEL
The EU has demonstrated itself as a leader on the issue of
climate change (Section V, below), but how is its domestic record of accomplishment? This chapter briefly reviews the track
record of the European Union's climate policy in the last decade
and its likely course in the next one. We will not focus on
Member States' climate strategies and policies as this would
fall beyond the scope of this paper.152 First, the regulatory
Carpenter, supra note 110, at, 313, 319.
See for an analysis of media coverage in Portugal Suraje Dessai, Kevin Branco,
Miguel de Fran!;a Doria, Climate Change and Media in Portugal: Preliminary Results,
poster presented at the International Conference on Climate Change: Science, Economics and Politics, Lisbon: November 3-4, 2000 (on me with authors).
149 NEWELL, supra note 120, at 79-86 with many examples.
150 [d. at 69 and references in 68-95.
151 This section is partly based on Suraje Dessai and Nuno Lacasta, What has the
European Union Been Doing on Climate Change? (2001) (unpublished manuscript on
me with autors) [hereinafter Dessai & Lacasta 2001].
162 For several analyses of different Member States plans and policies, see e.g. JOHN
GUMMER AND ROBERT MORELAND, THE EUROPEAN UNION & GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE,
A REVIEW OF FlVE NATIONAL PROGRAMS, PEW CENTER ON GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE,
2000 [hereinafter GUMMER & MORELAND]; Heather Broadbent, Study of the Dutch,
French and British Climate Change Programmes, Euronatura Working Paper 1/201
(January 2001), available at: <www.euronatura.pt> (visited Oct. 10, 2001) [hereinafter
Broadbent]; Suraje Dessai and Axel Michaelowa, Burden sharing and cohesion coun147

148
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framework is described, followed by the more recent initiatives,
including the European Climate Change Program (ECCP) and
a framework directive for greenhouse gas emissions trading
within the European Community.
As explained throughout this paper, EU policy is the result
of the complicated interaction between various interest groups
compounded by intra and inter-Member States politics.1 53 Climate policies in Europe have traditionally been divided into
environmental policies and energy policies. 154 By 1998, the EU
had some of the most progressive environmental policies in the
world. 155 Yet, just as one may consider EU environmental policy as a success in general, one may call EU energy policy a
failure. 156
As explained in Section II, in the absence of a clearly defined area of exclusive EU competence on climate change, it is
extremely difficult to isolate EU and Member States' obligations. Furthermore, comprehensive international environmental agreements (such as the UNFCCC or the Kyoto Protocol) are not easily related to the system of segregated legal
bases prescribed by the EU treaties.
"Initial steps to get climate policy in the EU agenda include a 1986 Resolution from the Parliament and Communications from the Commission in 1988 and 1989."157 The Fourth
Action Program on the Environment adopted in late 1987 and
covering the years 1987 to 1992,158 made no mention of climate
change except as a subject for further research. 159 Momentum
tries in European climate policy: the Portuguese example, 3/1 Climate Policy 327·341
(2001) [hereinafter Dessai & Michaelowa]; Nick Eyre, Carbon Reduction in the Real
World: How the UK will Surpass its Kyoto Obligations, 1/3 Climate Policy 309-326
[hereinafter "Eyre"]; and Joachim Schleich et ai., Greenhouse Gas Reductions in Germany -lucky strike or hard work?, id. at 363-380 [hereinafter Schleich et all.
153 See section IV, above.
154 See Wettestad, supra note 113, at 27-35.
155 At its founding in 1957, the EU had no environmental policy, no environmental
bureaucracy, and no environmental laws. When, in 1973, the EU began systematically
to address environmental concerns there was little expectation that the environment
would develop into one of the largest areas of common activity. See Andrew Jordan,
The implementation of EU environmental policy: a policy problem without a political
solution?, 17 ENVIRONMENT AND PLANNING C: GOVERNMENT AND POLICY, 69-90
(1999)[hereinafter Jordan].
156 Dahl, supra note 36, at 203-220.
157 See Wettestad, supra note 113, at 27.
158 See EEC Fourth Environmental Action Programme (1987-1992), O.J. (C328)
7.12.1987.
159 See Haigh, supra note 3, at 161.

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 2002

27

Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 32, Iss. 4 [2002], Art. 2

378 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 32:4
emerged, however, when the Council of Energy and Environment ministers in 1990 adopted a political agreement to stabilize C02 emissions in the ED as a whole at 1990 levels by the
year 2000. 160 Closer to the final stages of the negotiations of the
Convention in 1992, the Commission proposed to the Council
the following climate package of measures to be implemented
within the ED in the coming years: 161
•

A framework directive on energy efficiency within the
Special Action Program for Vigorous Energy Efficiency
(SAVE) program;

•

A decision on renewable energies - AL TENER program;

•

A directive on a combined carbon and energy tax; and

•

A decision concerning a monitoring mechanism for C02
emissions.

We will look at each such measure in more detail in the
next section.

B. REGULATORY COMPONENTS: WATERED DoWN?
The SAVE program was designed to improve energy efficiency within the ED in order to reduce C02 emissions and improve security of supply. The program was actually launched in
1987, but only in October 1991 did the Council of Energy Ministers manage to approve it.l 62 At that stage, the program emphasized the adoption and implementation of several existing
Directive proposals on energy efficiency standards across a
range of sectors from power generation to buildings, vehicles
and household appliances. 163 But by the time it had been
160 See European Community Conclusions on climate change. Council of Environment Ministers, European Community, October 1990.
161 See Community strategy to limit carbon dioxide emissions and to improve energy
efficiency, COM(92) 246. Given the Commission's traditional desire to expand its competence, it chose the path of trying to develop a complete and ambitious package of
measures to be agreed together (See Haigh, supra note 3, at 164.
162 Decision 91/565/EC (7) established a program to promote energy efficiency in the
Community (the SAVE program); O.J. (L 307) 08.11.1991, at 34.
163 It was estimated that the program could lead to emission reductions of about 3%
in the year 2000 (Wettestad, supra note 113, at 31-32).
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adopted in 1993, all the legislative proposals had either been
watered down or removed entirely. SAVE was turned into a
framework directive merely laying out general principles for
action to guide Member States' own programs and measures,
short on targets, deadlines and content. 164 Most commentators
argue that the program failed due to insufficient funding and a
new interpretation of the subsidiarity principle,165 which led
much of its regulatory content to be abandoned or severely diluted. SAVE is considered to have had little impact on energy
efficiency in the Member States. 166 The few gains achieved by
the first SAVE program were based on the legislative component of the program, which is missing from the SAVE II
framework. 167 Instead SAVE II, which was adopted in December 1996,168 intends to rely on voluntary agreements with
equipment manufacturers on labeling and energy standards.
The SAVE II proposal includes only a modest target to improve
the overall efficiency on energy use in the EU by one per cent
over the next five years, and has been subject to significant
budgets cuts that undermine its ability to meet its self-declared
goals. 169
The two technology-oriented programs, the THERMIE170
and the JOULEl7l programs, are intended to bring about a 1020 per cent reduction in C02 emissions between 2010 and 2020.
A recent evaluation of THERMIE indicated that it had made
an impact on market shares for energy efficiency technology,
but clean coal funding under the program has been criticized
by environmental groups for displacing focus on renewables,
and for making only a small contribution to lowering C02 emissions.1 72 JOULE and THERMIE have been merged into
164 See WYN GRANT, DUNCAN MATIHEWS & PETER NEWELL, THE EFFECTIVENESS OF
EUROPEAN UNION ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY, MACMILLAN PRESS, LoNDON (2000), Section III [hereinafter GRANT ET ALl.
165 [d. Section III and note 5.
166 Collier as quoted by Wettestad, supra note 113, at 32.
167 Decision 961737/EC established the new multi-annual SAVE II program to continue and strengthen the action of the original SAVE program. See Council Decision
96/737/EC, O.J. (L335) 24.12.96.
168 The originally proposed 150 million ECU budget of SAVE II was cut to 45 million
by the Energy Council in May 1996. See Wettestad, supra note 113, at 32).
169 See GRANT ET AL, supra note 164, Section III.
170 For the strengthening of existing measures to promote the dissemination of better energy conversion and use technologies.
!7l Focusing on energy research and development.
172 See GRANT ET AL, supra note 164, Section III.
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ENERGIE, a subprogram on energy of the thematic program
"Energy, Environment and Sustainable Development" within
the EU Fifth Framework Program for Research, Technological
Development and Demonstration (1999-2002). The ENERGIE
Program is organized principally around two key actions:
Cleaner Energy Systems, including Renewable Energies, and
Economic and Efficient Energy for a Competitive Europe supplemented by coordination and cooperative activities of a sectoral and cross-sectoral nature. With targets guided by the
Kyoto protocol and associated policies, ENERGIE's integrated
activities are focused on creating and applying new solutions
which achieve balanced improvements to Europe's energy, environmental and economic performance and thereby contribute
towards a sustainable future for Europe's citizens.1 73
Established in March 1993, the ALTENER174 Directive on
"the promotion of renewable energy sources in the EU' followed
a similar fate to SAVE. Its scope and content were considerably
reduced and its budget deemed insufficientY5 It contained specific targets but no substantial tools for implementation.
ALTENER II was funded with a budget of merely twenty-two
million ECU (the Parliament and Commission had proposed
more than thirty million 176) for 1998-1999.177 A Commission
Paper published in December 1997 called for a doubling of the
proportion of EU energy needs supplied by renewables to
twelve percent by 2010. 178 Opposed by the UK, France and
Germany, the Council accepted the Commission's target only
by way of guidance making it a voluntary target for Member
States.1 79 Some progress was achieved in September 2001,
See http://europa.eu.int/comm/energy/enlprog5.htm, (visited Mar. 4, 2002).
Council Decision 93/500/EEC on the adoption of a Program for the Promotion of
Renewable Energy Sources, O.J. (L 235) 18.9.1993, at 41).
175 See Wettestad, supra note 113, at 32.
176 [d. at 32.
177 Council Decision concerning a multi-annual program for the promotion of renewable energy sources in the Community (Altener II), 98/352/EC, O.J. (L159) 03/06/1998,
at 53.
178 Communication from the Commission: Energy for the future: Renewable Energy
Sources· White Paper for a Community Strategy and Action Plan, COM(97)599 final.
According to the White Paper, renewables currently supply just 5.3 per cent of EU
energy consumption.
179 See GRANT ET AL, supra note 164. Efforts to promote renewables are also undermined by the continued use of subsidies to fossil fuels. A Greenpeace report on 'Energy
subsidies in Europe' showed that more than 90 per cent of direct subsidies from Euro173
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when the Energy Council adopted the Directive on the promotion of electricity produced from renewable energy sources in
the internal electricity market. 180 After more than a year under
discussion, the Directive was weakened in a number of areas
compared to the draft Directive released by the Commission. 181
Nonetheless, the adopted Directive requires that the EU
double the use of renewables in the energy supply,182 The Directive includes indicative targets for individual members'
states, which will be required to draft and adopt legislation to
achieve these targets. 183 The renewables Directive was clearly a
positive step, but it is still uncertain how the Member States
will implement it, since the Directive leaves much scope for
interpretation. Progress will monitor the Directive's progress
and may, as a result, make further proposals, including for
mandatory targets.
As this brief review has shown, regulatory measures have
been consistently bogged down either through the principle of
subsidiarity or lack of funding, both demonstrating overall lack
of political will to act at the EC leveL Furthermore, poor implementation and regulatory failure remain a problem within
the EU.184 This gap may partly be attributed to the fact that it
is the Environment Council that makes climate policy announcements and other Council formations, e.g. Energy, (as
well as the Member States) that undertake the implementation
of relevant legislation. Some of the measures that have been
proposed to close the implementation gap include making use
of non-regulatory instruments such as taxes, tradable permits,
and voluntary agreements. We now turn to those policy mstruments and analyze the ED's attempt to introduce them.

pean governments to the energy industry go to fossil fuels. Kirsty Hamilton, The Oil
Industry and Climate Change 14 (Greenpeace International 1998).
180 Directive on the promotion of electricity produced from renewable energy sources
in the internal electricity market, 2001177/EC, O.J. (L.283) 27.10.2001, at 33.
181 Energy for the future: renewable sources of energy, COM(97)599 fmal; also
known as White Paper for a Community Strategy and Action Plan.
182 Article 3 of supra note 180.
183Id.
184 See Jordan, supra note 155, at 69.
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C. THE ENERGy/CARBON TAX AND FISCAL MEASURES: TOTAL
FIASCO?
In 1992, the European Commission proposed a Directive
for the introduction of a tax on all energy products, excluding
renewables, based 50% on energy content and 50% on the carbon content of fuels. 185 The objective was to improve energy
efficiency and favor fuel substitution towards products emitting
less or no C02. It was proposed to introduce the tax in steps.
Mter seven years the rates would have reached 0.7 ECU/GJ
and 9.4 ECU/C02, equivalent to $10 per barrel. Graduated reductions and conditional exemptions from the tax were to be
applied for energy intensive firms.186 The tax proposal was estimated to lead to a reduction in C02 emissions of around 10%
ten years after implementation, compared to a business-asusual scenario. Depending on the business-as-usual scenario,
this would imply no growth or a slight reduction in C02 emissions compared to 1990 levels. The tax was intended to be levied in addition to existing excise duties.
No agreement was ever reached in the Council, where this
proposal encountered strong opposition from some countries
and transnational industry. The "cohesion countries" (i.e.,
Spain, Greece, Portugal and Ireland)187 could only accept the
proposal in return for additional structural funding, and
France argued for a pure carbon tax in order to protect its nuclear industry.188 Using the subsidiarity principle, the UK argued that it would be more appropriate to develop such a tax at
the national leveJ.189 The tax proposal has been halted ever
since. The 1994 decision of the Council in Essen does no more
185 Proposal for a Council Directive introducing a tax on carbon dioxide emissions
and energy, COM(92)226 final.
186Id.

The Treaty of Maastricht created the so·called "Cohesion Fund" aimed at financing infrastructure and environmental projects in those Member States where the gross
national domestic is less than 90% of the EU average. Greece, Ireland, Portugal and
Spain are currently within that threshold, and are thus knows as "cohesion" Member
States. See Maastrich Treaty, supra note 3.
188 See Skjrerseth as quoted by Wettestad, supra note 113, at 29.
189 Hence, the UK's objection to a C02 tax did not concern the idea of fiscal measures in the climate change package as such but rather tax harmonization at the EU
level. Taxation for the UK is the responsibility of the Member States (Haigh, supra
note 3, at 165; Dahl, supra note 36, at 217).
187
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than enable Member States to apply a carbon/energy tax "if
[they] so desire."190
The idea of a C02 tax has not been abandoned, but proposals for other, more indirect avenues have been discussed as
well. 191 Former environment Commissioner, Ritt Bjerregaard,
stated publicly that the ED could not avoid a carbon/energy tax
if it intends to reduce C02 emissions after the year 2000 because energy prices are currently too low to stimulate improvements in efficiency.192 The ED-wide carbon/energy tax
has the potential to reduce greenhouse gas emissions considerably, but will probably remain on the "shelf' because of the
requirement for consensus in ED fiscal environmental policies.
In the meantime, Member States should address the issue, as
the DK has done, with the introduction of the climate change
levy on April 2001. Furthermore the development of a ED-wide
emissions trading scheme might relieve the pressure from the
development of taxation initiatives, especially if trading leads
to significant emission reductions within the ED.
D. MONITORING MECHANISM FOR GREENHOUSE GASES: SOME
HOPE?

The only substantive piece of ED legislation to have been
adopted by the Council so far was the establishment of a monitoring mechanism for greenhouse gases. On June 24, 1993 the
Council of Environment Ministers adopted Decision
93/389/EECI93 establishing a monitoring mechanism in the
Community for anthropogenic C02 and other greenhouse gas
emissions not controlled by the Montreal Protocol. The monitoring mechanism serves a double purpose of monitoring progress towards the stabilization of C02 emissions at 1990 levels
by the year 2000, and towards the fulfillment of the Community's joint commitments under the .1992 Climate Convention.
The Decision requires each Member State "to devise, publish,
implement and periodically update national programs for limit-

Haigh, id., at 165-166.
Wettestad, supra note 113, at 29.
192 See Dessai & Lacasta 2001, supra note 151, at 9.
193 Council Decision 93/389/EEC for a monitoring mechanism of Community C02
and other greenhouse gas emissions, O.J. (L 167) 9.7.1993, at 31.
190
191
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ing their anthropogenic emissions of C02."194 The Commission
annually evaluates the national programs in order to assess
whether progress in the Community as a whole is sufficient to
attain the stabilization objective. For the performed evaluations 195 under this Decision, the Commission concluded that
the information provided was still not sufficient to evaluate
progress towards the Community stabilization target in a satisfactory way.196 Compliance with Decision 93/389 has not been
impressive because the annual assessments, a key part of the
Decision, seem to have been virtually ignored. 197
Decision 93/389/EEC was revised in April 1999,198 to allow
for the updating of the monitoring process in line with the inventory requirements incorporated into the Kyoto Protocol. The
amendment strengthened national program requirements on
policies and measures, which should include (a) information on
actual progress and (b) information on projected progress.
Member States are required to submit by December 31 inventory data for the two previous years, any updates of previous
years (including the base year 1990) and their most recent projected emissions for the years 2005, 2010, 2015 and 2020. As
many commentators have argued,199 the term "monitoring
mechanism" does not convey its full potential importance,
which has taken on a particular relevance with the burdensharing agreement under the EU ''bubble'' (See section V below). This mechanism could playa critical role in ensuring

194 ld. Article 2.1. See also Joy Hyvarinen, The European Community's Monitoring
Mechanism for C02 and other Greenhouse Gases; the Kyoto Protocol and other Recent
Development, 8 RECIEL, 191, 197 n.2 (2000) [hereinafter HyvarinenJ.
195 The fIrst evaluation report, which was issued on 10.03.1994, covers the period 1990·
1993. See Report from the Commission under Council Decision 93/389/EEC, First
Evaluation of Existing National Programs under the Monitoring Mechanism of Com·
munity C02 and Other Greenhouse Gas Emissions COM(94)67 fInal, 10.03.1994 at 6.
The second evaluation report was issued on 14 March 1996. See Report from the
Commission under Council Decision 93/389/EEC, Second Evaluation of Existing National Programmes under the Monitoring Mechanism of Community C02 and Other
Greenhouse Gas Emissions COM(96)91 fInal, 14.03.1996, at 1.
196 ld.
197 See Hyvarinen supra note 194, at 193.
198 Council Decision 99/296/EC amending Decision 93/389/EEC for a monitoring
mechanism of Community C02 and other greenhouse gas emissions, O.J. (L 117)
05.05.1999, at 35.
199 See e.g. Haigh, supra note 3; and Hyvarinen, supra note 194.
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that the EU and Member States stay on track towards their
targets under the Convention and the Kyoto Protocol.
The fIrst progress report under Decision 99/296/EC was released in November 2000. 200 The Commission saw good progress in Member State's reporting on emission inventories and
some progress with regard to national policies/measures and
projections. However, much remains to be done with regard to
the completeness, accuracy and comparability of the data, especially those on projections. The report concluded that:
• The EU's greenhouse gas emissions fell by 2.5% between
1990 and 1998;
• The majority of Member States are far away from their
target paths towards Kyoto; the transport sector being
the fastest-growing emission sector;
• "Business-as-usual" projections suggest that existing policies and measures would at best reduce overall EU emissions in 2010 by 57 Mt C02, taking emissions to 1.4%, or
at worst 0% below the 1990 level;
• Additional policies and measures identified by Member
States are projected to yield further reductions close to
7% below 1990 levels;
• Projections have considerable uncertainty because of the
lack of quantified data on additional measures, lack of
comparability of methodologies used and uncertainty over
implementation of the policies and measures. 201

This means the EU as a whole is expected to have met its
commitment under the .Convention, i.e. to stabilize emissions
at 1990 levels by the year 2000. However, this positive evolution is more a "fortuitous" result of the economic collapse and
modernization in eastern Germany and the unintended consequence of "dash for gas" resulting from the privatization in the
UK's energy sector. 202 The 1999 LandfIll directive 203 is also
200 Report under Council Decision 1999/296/EC for a monitoring mechanism of
Community greenhouse gas emissions, COM(2000)749, final 22.11.2000.
201 [d.
202 Natural gas particular emits less C02 than coal or oil. See GRUBB ET AL, supra
note 11, at 81.
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expected to have a considerable impact on the reduction of
overall emissions. 204 However, compliance with the ambitious
Kyoto target of -8% will prove much harder for the EU and its
Member States. The Monitoring Mechanism report concludes
by arguing that in view of the difficulties that the Member
States face in meeting their Kyoto commitments under the
Burden Sharing Agreement, common and coordinated policies
and measures at EU level will become an increasingly important element to supplement and reinforce national climate
strategies. The Commission has proposed policies and measures, e.g. on energy taxation, renewables, energy efficiency,
vehicle emissions and landfills, and intends to intensify such
ongoing work through the European Climate Change Program
(ECCP), which is further discussed below. Results from the
ECCP will form the basis for concrete policy proposals in the
areas of energy, transport, industry and agriculture and for an
internal EU emissions trading scheme.

E. VOLUNTARY AGREEMENTS: Is EUROPE GETTING THEM
RIGHT?

Environmental voluntary agreements have been emphasized in the EU Sixth Environment Action Program. 205 During
the 1990s, they received increased attention as an alternative
or supplement to traditional policy instruments, particularly in
the field of energy efficiency. Voluntary Agreements can more
specifically be defined as "commitments between authorities
and target groups setting forth environmental objectives based
on voluntary participation or absence of sanctions as part of the
commitments themselves.''206 In the EU context, the promotion
of agreements with industry can be seen as part of the effort to
broaden participation and the range of policy instruments, and
thus implement the concept of "shared responsibility" empha-

203 1999/31/EC Council Directive 1999/311EC of Apr. 26, 1999 on the landfill of
waste, O.J. (L 182) 16.07.1999, at.l
204 See Christoph Bail, Simon Marr and Sebastian Oberthiir, Klimaschutz und Recht
(2002) (manuscript on file with authors).
205 See Wettestad supra note 113, at 37.
206 See Skjrerseth as quoted by Wettestad, id. at 37-38.
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sized in the 1992 Fifth Action Program and the 'wider constituency' proposed in the Sixth Environment Action Program.
Voluntary Agreements are widely applied in EU Member
States, but few at EU level.207 Recently, the European Commission and the European Automobile Manufacturers Association 208 signed a Voluntary Agreement to reach a 25% reduction
of C02 emissions from passenger cars by 2008. 209 Agreements
have been reached with the Japan Automobile Manufacturers
Association (JAMA) and the Korean Automobile Manufacturers
Association (KAMA).210 Voluntary Agreements, however, are
not free of problems. Besides the difficulty of separating their
specific effects from more general societal factors and processes, Voluntary Agreements are also likely to work best in
''benign'' conditions; with energy efficiency as a relevant climate policy example.2l1 As an April 2000 Commission Recommendation noted, "The agreement with the auto industry is an
interesting development, but it is too early to judge whether
this was a regulatory breakthrough or a regulatory cop out."212
F. THE EUROPEAN CLIMATE CHANGE PROGRAM

The Environment Council of October 1999 urged the Commission to put forward a list of priority action on climate
change as early as possible in 2000 and to prepare appropriate
proposals in due course. 213 In response, the European Climate
Change Program (ECCP) was created. 214 The driving force behind the ECCP is the uncertainty and difficulties Members

207 For a review of voluntary agreements in Member States, See OECD, Voluntary
Approaches for Environmental Protection in the European Union (Dec.10, 1998),
ENV/EPOC/G EEI(98) 29/FINAL.
208 See ACEA and European Commission, C02 emissions from cars, The EU Imple·
menting the Kyoto Protocol (1998).
209 See Wettestad, supra note 113, at 39.
210 Commission Recommendation of Apr. 13, 2000 on the reduction of C02 emissions
from passenger cars (KAMA), O.J. (L 100) 20.04.2000, at 55. Commission Recommendation of Apr. 13, 2000 on the reduction of C02 emissions from passenger cars (JAMA).
O.J. (L 100) 20.04.2000, at 57.
211 Id, at 38.
212Id.
213 Council Conclusions on a Community strategy on Climate Change, Doc.
11654/99, Luxembourg Oct. 12, 1999.
214 Communication from the Commission on EU policies and measures to reduce
greenhouse gas emissions: Towards a European Climate Change Programme (ECCP),
COM(2000)88 Final 8.3.2000 [hereinafter ECCP Communication].
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States will face in fulfilling their commitments. 215 Under current policies and measures the overall EU emission reduction
in 2010 will lie somewhere between -1.4% and 0%. The ECCP
emerged as a means of reinforcing common and coordinated
policies and measures at the Community level, in the face of
consistent weakening or altogether dropout of Commission
proposals. These measures are supplemental to actions taken
by Member States in the fulfillment of their Kyoto targets. The
ECCP has taken a multi-stakeholder approach 216 in the preparation of the proposals to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. The
scope of the program is limited to achieving the Kyoto target of
-8%, but in the mid and long-term perspective, the ECCP will
address issues such as adaptation; international cooperation
through capacity-building and technology transfer; research/observation; demonstration of efficient; and clean technologies and training and education. 217
The ECCP established a Steering Committee218 to coordinate six Working Groups:
1.

Flexible mechanisms

2. Energy supply
3.

Energy consumption

4.

Transport

5. Industry
6. Research

Some Working Groups have sub-groups. The Commission's
role is to coordinate and facilitate the different Working
Groups in this innovative integration exercise. The results of
the "Economic Evaluation of Sectoral Emission Reductions Ob215 For a review of some Member State's climate programs, See Eyre; Scleich et al.;
GUMMER & MORELAND; Broadbent; and Dessai & Michaelowa, all supra note 152.
216 Which has brought together relevant stakeholders such as representatives of the
Commission, the Member States, industry and the NGO community. See ECCP Communication, supra note 214.
2171d.
218 Composed of all Commission services that take part in the ECCP.
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jectives for Climate Change" 219 study were used as inputs for
each Working Group, so they have to be briefly mentioned. This
EU-commissioned report which identifies a least-cost allocation
of objectives for different sectors and greenhouse gases, would
allow the EU to reach its Kyoto target. 220 With caveats and
limitations, the study combines a "top-down" and a ''bottom-up''
methodology to understand different cost-effective greenhouse
gas mitigation options. The study results show that instead of
having each sector reduce its emissions by 8%, some sectors
need to reduce their emissions by more than 8%: energy supply
(11 %), fossil fuel extraction (46%), industry (26%), agriculture
(8%) and waste (28%). According to this sectoral least-cost allocation approach compliance costs are predicted to be 0.06% of
EU gross domestic product. 221 A number of other studies provide estimates in a similar range of up to 0.3%.222 According to
this study the six most cost-effective ways for the EU to reach
its Kyoto target are:
1.

Decarbonization of energy supply:
a. Further switching from coal to gas;
b. More efficient generation of power (e.g. increasing
the share of Combined Heat and Power);
c. Increase in the use of renewable energy (notably biomass and wind energy).

2. Improvement of energy efficiency, particularly in industry,
households (retrofitting) and services sector.
3. Further reduction of nitrous oxide from the adipic acid industry and implementation of reduction options in the nitric
acid industry.
4. Reductions of methane emissions in coal mmmg, oil and
natural gas, and waste and agriculture sectors.

219 Kornelis Blok, David de Jager and Chris Hendriks. Economic Evaluation of Sec·
toral Emission Reduction Objectives for Climate Change - Summary Report for Policy
Makers, ECOFYS Energy and Environment, March 2001 [hereinafter Blok et all.
220 Id. at 1. The intention was to identify a least·cost allocation so that the cost of
production of energy and other goods would increase as little as possible.
221 Had the allocation been done at a Member State level instead of EU·wide, the
compliance costs would more than double (Id. at iv).
222 European Commission Proposal for ratification of the Kyoto Protocol by the
European Community COM(2001)579 final;
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5. Reduction of fluorinated gases in specific applications, e.g.
industrial processes, mobile air conditioning and commercial
refrigeration.
6. Energy efficiency improvement measures in the transport
system. 223

The results from this study served as the basis for discussion of the ECCP Working Groups, which came up with measures based on criteria of cost efficiency, emission reduction potential, time horizon and political acceptability. Each Working
Group met several times in 2000 and 2001. The Commission
was then urged to develop concrete policy proposals that have
been presented as a package of me~sures in four areas: crosscutting, energy, transport and industry (see table 2, below).224

Table 2: ECCP Policy Proposals
Cross Cutting Issues
- Promoting effective implementation of the Integrated Pollution Prevention and Control Directive
- Proposal for a Directive on linking project-based mechanisms including Joint Implementation and Clean Development
Mechanism to EC emissions trading scheme
- Proposal for a review of the monitoring mechanism

Energy Issues
- Proposal for a Framework Directive for minimum efficiency
requirements for end-use equipment
- Proposal for a Directive on energy demand management
- Proposal for a Directive for the promotion of Combined Heat
and Power
- Non-legislative proposals: Initiatives on increased energyefficient public procurement; Public awareness campaign and
campaign take-off

Blok et aI, supra note 219, at iv·v.
See European Commission Communication on the implementation of the rll'st
phase of the ECCP COM(2001)580 final.
223
224
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Table 2 Continued: ECCP Policy Proposals
Transport
- Proposal for shifting the balance between modes of transport
- Proposal for improvement in infrastructure use and charging
- Promotion of the use of biofuels for transport
Industry
- Proposal for a Framework Directive on fluorinated gases

Without scrutinizing each item individually, the climate
package is ambitious and worthy of the "leader" of the climate
regime. Nonetheless; according to the Commission, the emissions reduction effects of these measures are unlikely to meet
the Kyoto targets, thus the need to examine additional measures from the on-going ECCP process. Mter a decade of weakened proposals, but at the same time building on them, European climate policy is finally starting to shape up. However, all
these efforts will be in vain if the Council does not quickly
adopt and implement these proposals. Only then, will the ED
be able to show directional leadership, i.e., leadership by example. 225

G. THE COMMISSION PROPOSAL FOR AN EMISSIONS TRADING
DIRECTIVE
In 1999 the European Commission suggested that the best
way for the Community and its Member States to get acquainted with the Kyoto mechanisms would be to develop their
own emissions trading scheme. 226 A paper227 on greenhouse gas
emissions trading within the ED was released in 2000 for
wider consultation with stakeholders. Ninety comments overwhelmingly supporting emissions trading - were received
from governmental organizations, businesses and NGOs
throughout Europe. 228 The proposal for a framework directive
GUPTA & GRUBB, supra note 4, at 21
Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament - Preparing for Implementation of the Kyoto Protocol COM(1999)230, final.
227 Green Paper on greenhouse gas emissions trading within the European Union,
COM(2000)87, final [hereinafter Emissions Trading Greenpaper].
228 See <http://europa.eu.int/commlenvironment/documl0087_en.htm seen in 23 Jan.
225
226
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was released just before COP-7 (2001) as part of the EU climate package. While neither industry nor NGOs seemed fully
content with the proposal, the Commission appears to have
taken a middle-ground position, which we briefly describe next.
Beside providing experience in a scheme that will later be
used internationally,229 an internal emissions trading system
will enhance the cost-effectiveness of emission reductions by
making emission reductions as cheap as possible wherever they
may occur in the Community. The Commission proposed a capand-trade approach covering heavy industry sectors across the
EU. This proposal revolves around two key concepts: greenhouse gas "permit" and greenhouse gas "allowance." All installations under the scheme will be required to have permits that
will lay down monitoring, reporting and verification requirements in respect of direct emissions of greenhouse gases specified in relation to those activities. Member States will allocate
allowances to all installations holding permits that can then be
transferred to other companies. "Each year, companies must
submit for cancellation a number of allowances that corresponds to their actual emissions. If they do not have enough
allowances, sanctions will be imposed on them."23o The scheme
will run between 2005 and 2007, before the Kyoto Protocol's
first commitment period starts. The rationale of using emissions trading is based on the fact that it provides certainty
about the environmental outcomes. 231 However, under this proposal, the Member States rather than the EU will decide on
initial allocations. The Monitoring Mechanism in conjunction
with national transaction registries will perform the tracking of
traded allowances. Only carbon dioxide emissions will be covered in the beginning of the scheme because they represent
80% of the Community's greenhouse gas emissions. Penalties
for non-compliance have also been envisaged: set at 0100 per
excess tone or twice the average market price during that period.
02> (visited Dec. 9, 2001).
229 The difficulties that might result from inconsistent systems within the EU offer a
microcosm of the larger challenge. See Jacoby & Reiner, supra note 58, at 310.
230 Proposal for a framework Directive for greenhouse gas emissions trading within
the European Community, COM(2001)581, final.
231 See Emissions Trading Green paper, supra note 227, at 7·9.
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Designing an emissions trading scheme is not a trivial
task, least of all if one is to consider all stakeholder interests
from a variety of Member States. Member States and particular interest groups remain divided in the details of this emissions trading directive. 232
In the previous sections we overviewed some key aspects of
EU policymaking on climate change from an institutional and
actors-based perspective, as well as the key developments of a
"domestic" EU climate policy. We now turn to an analysis of
selected elements in the Kyoto Protocol negotiations between
1992 and the present day i.e. between the signing of the
UNFCCC at the Rio Earth Summit (UNCED) and COP-7 in
late 2001.
V. THE EU ON SELECTED ISSUES OF THE CLIMATE CHANGE
REGIME
Almost ten years have passed since the adoption of the
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. A
full fledge analysis of the climate change regime, even if specifically focused on the EU track record, is beyond the scope of
this paper. We will instead focus on key selected areas of the
last ten years of the negotiations by providing illustrations of
how the EU positioned itself with regard to such areas. We
will draw upon the available literature and official documents,
as well as on our own experience-including multiple interactions with many different participants-in taking part in different capacities in the climate negotiations since the mid
1990s. Finally, the select issue-oriented approach to this
analysis will be played in the context of the different chronological milestones, which the climate change regime has gone
through. These milestones are summarized immediately below.
As mentioned in the introduction,233 the UNFCCC went
through essentially three phases after it was signed. The first
phase was between the Convention's signature in 1992 until
232

See for example ENDS daily: "EU states divided over climate emission trading",

13112/2001, available at: www.environmentdaily.comlarticles/index.cfm?action=arti .

cleref=11232&searchtext=l!:uistatesdivided&seerchtype=phrase (visited Apr. 12, 2002).
233

See supra table 1.
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COP-1 in Berlin, Germany, when Parties decided to strengthen
the regime. The next phase corresponded to the Kyoto Protocol
negotiations that began in 1995 (COP-1) and culminated with
the adoption of the Protocol at COP-3 in Japan in 1997. The
third and present phase of over 4 years corresponds to the period in which Parties negotiated the key operational rules and
guidelines under the Protocol, which were essential for its ratification and entry into force-which depends on a majority of
55 Parties, including Annex I Parties that account for 55% of
this Annex's C02 emissions. 234
Throughout this past decade the EU has remained committed to push for what has generally been perceived as stringent
climate change standards,235 somewhat in contrast with its own
domestic track record, as explained in the previous section. If
one can summarize the following subsections, the EU positioning was predicated on the ability of the Member States and the
Community to jointly fulfill their target obligations under the
Protocol. This fact has consistently conditioned the EU position, leading it often to renege or soften other positions in order
to secure its primary objective. The following analysis will focus on three issues: policies and measures, emission targets,
and developing countries.
A. POLICIES AND MEASURES: EXPORTING DOMESTIC
APPROACHES OR INTERNATIONAL PRETEXT FOR DOMESTIC
COORDINATION?

A key element in the EU negotiation strategy leading up to
Kyoto consisted of a package of so-called "common and coordinated policies and measures," such as a carbon/energy tax or
energy efficiency standards, to be adopted by Parties. 236 The
EU spent much of its internal discussions and negotiating capital devising and presenting this package to other Parties. The

Article 25.1 of the Protocol, supra note 6.
See e.g. Dessai & Lacasta 2001, supra note 151; Yamin, supra note 12; and
OBERTHUR & OTT, supra note 3.
236 GRUBB ET AL, supra note_ll, at 65, define "policies and measures" as "any action
which Parties can adopt, either nationally or internationally, to reduce emissions or
enhance sinks."
234

235
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policies and measures text that was eventually agreed upon is
much too weak to be claimed as a EU negotiating success.
The discussion on policies and measures effectively began
at COP-1 in Berlin (1995). Due to statements from progressive
Member States and NGO pressure, the EU managed to forge
an alliance, the so-called "green group," with developing countries (minus OPEC237) against the JUSSCANNZ countries. 238
This coalition paved the way for the adoption of the Berlin
Mandate, which included the EU proposal to call on developed
country Parties "to elaborate on policies and measures."239
To that effect and throughout 1996 and part of 1997 the
EU went through an intense internal process to prepare severallists of policies and measures. This proposal was submitted
in mid 1997, and at its core consisted of three annexes containing three' sets of policies and measures. Annex I included
"[mandatory] Policies and measures common to all [OECD]
Parties;" Annex II ''Policies and measures to be given high priority by [OECD] Parties and for coordination with other Parties;" and Annex III "National policies and measures to be
given priority for inclusion in national programmes of [OECD]
Parties ... as appropriate to national circumstances."240
This proposal was not, however, further elaborated, thus
provoking considerable criticism and "irritation" from other
negotiating Parties. 241 In fact, those Parties never showed
much interest in following the EU approach of binding policies
and measures. 242 The U.S., although initially signaling some

Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries.
JUSSCANNZ was an informal grouping of the following like-minded countries:
Japan, United States, Switzerland, Canada, Australia, Norway and New Zealand.
After the adoption of the Protocol, with Switzerland dropping out, the remaining members plus Iceland, Russia and Ukraine became to be knows as "Umbrella Group." This
more recent formation is especially focused on a coordinated position around the Protocol's flexible mechanisms of joint implementation (Article 6), clean development
mechanism (Article 12) and international emissions trading (Article 17). See Kyoto
Protocol, supra note 6.
239 See COP-I Report, Decision 1/CP.1, supra note 23;. This process was called the
Ad Hoc Group on the Berlin Mandate or "AGBM." Id.
240 See U.N. Doc. FCCC/AGBMl1997/3/Add.1, at 103-123.
241 Yamin, supra note 12, at 53.
242 Japan (which nonetheless pres!lnted its own proposal), the Alliance of Small
Island States (AOSIS) and some Central and Eastern European countries in the line
up for EU membership conveyed some mild, however unsubstantiated, support. In
fact, the EU's fIrst attempt in 1995 to discuss policies and measures had been "met
with little enthusiasm." See e.g. GRUBB ET AL, supra note 11, at 63.
237
238
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interest in discussing policies and measures in general,243 came
out in favor of targets and timetables at COP-2 (1996). (See
next subsection.) It further stated that it "fIrmly opposed
mandatory, harmonized policies and measures that would be
imposed upon us in order to reach our target."244 As a result,
the D.S. did not submit any proposal on policies and measures.
In the face of such widespread opposition, why did the ED keep
insisting on its proposals on policies and measures? Commentators have essentially given two reasons for that fact: the fIrst
reason is based on internal ED politics, and the second views
the ED position as a default position in the face of U.S. early
opposition to targets.
The fIrst reason is that some internal political issues, despite considerable discussion, remained fundamentally unresolved among the Member States and the Commission. As a
result, some Member States transferred such considerations to
the international level, in the hopes of attracting some support
for their views. 245 The ED certainly had a long history of policy
coordination in such areas as trade, agriculture and environment. However, as explained in section IV above, by 1997 it
had failed to implement meaningful policies and measures on
climate change-most notably an energy/carbon tax. As a result, the European Commission in particular might have had
an interest in exploring the policies and measures avenue as a
way to extend its competences on climate change. 246 An energy/carbon tax, which the Commission had kept under discussion,247 required harmonization at ED level and was conditional on comparable efforts by the ED's competitors-e.g. the
U.S. and Japan. 248 This measure, it was argued, would suggest

243 Which led some EU Member States to believe the U.S. was might be for policies
and measures rather than targets. See OBERTHUR & OTT, supra note 3, at 105.
244 Statement of Stuart Eizenstat before the U.S. House International Relations
Committee, Washington, DC, 13 May 1998, as quoted in OBERTHUR & OTT, supra
note 3, id.
245 OBERTHUR & OTT, supra note 3, at 104; and Yamin, supra note 12, at 53.
246 See supra, section II, and the discussion therein on climate change as an area of
"shared" or "mixed" competence between the EC and its Member States.
247 As explained supra in Section II, Under the EC treaty the Commission retains
the exclusive competence to propose EC regulatory measures.
248 See for a discussion on the principle of conditionality of the EU proposal of a
energy/carbon tax, Wettestad, supra note 113; and Manners, supra note 41.
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international coordination. 249 In addition to the Commission,
smaller Member States also favored the policies and measures
approach as a way to ensure that their particularly open
economies would not be comparatively disadvantaged should
they take domestic action on climate change. 25o However, as
Farhana Yamin sharply observes, analyzing the EU international climate change negotiating strategy "the fact that these
same countries could not get other EU Member States to agree
internally to mandatory [policies and measures] should have
alerted them to the difficulty of trying to persuade a more heterogeneous and larger number of states ..." Rather than seeing itself as a microcosm of the larger group, the EU appeared
to have thought of the [Ad Hoc Group on the Berlin Mandate
(AGBM)]251 process as having the ability to solve the EU own
internal problems. 252
The second reason advanced by commentators for the EU's
insistence on policies and measures is of a tactical nature vis-avis the u.S. in particular. At the beginning of the AGBM process the U.S. had not yet signaled a preference for targets and
timetables. Some in the EU therefore viewed the proposal on
binding policies and measures as a way to put pressure on the
JUSSCANNZ in general and on the U.S. in particular to either
approach. 253 However, the EU's continued insistence on policies and measures even after the United States' announcement
on targets suggests that the strategy did little more than irritate other negotiating partners while proving ultimately to be
unsuccessfuL
The Protocol text does not contain any reference to binding
policies and measures. Article 2 of the Protocol merely lists
examples of policies and measures to be taken by each Party
"in accordance with its national circumstances."254 Article 2.4

249 The notion of an internationally coordinated carbon tax had been opposed by
most OECD members and OPEC, even in the run· up to the UNFCCC. GRUBB ET AL,
supra note_ll, at 67, even suggest that the EU proposal on policies with its taxation
component was "thinly veiled criticism of cheap U.S. gasoline (a topic of transatlantic
dispute ever since the first oil shock in 1973) and a red rag to OPEC which viewed such
proposals as a conspiracy to grab its oil rent revenues."
250 OBERTHUR & OTT, supra note 3, at 103·104 and Yamin, supra note 12, at 53.
251 See supra note 239.
252 Yamin, supra note 12, at 53. See also GRUBB ET AL, supra note 11, at 68.
253 OBERTHUR & OTT, supra note 3, at 105; and Yamin, id., at 52.
254 See Kyoto Protocol, supra note 6, Article 2.1.
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further opens the door for the future consideration of policies
and measures "coordination."255
Since the adoption of the Protocol in 1997, policies and
measures have barely been in the negotiators' attention span.
This is mainly because Parties were busy crafting the Protocol's key operational rules on, e.g., the flexible mechanisms and
monitoring, reporting and verification of Parties' emissions. 256
As a result, Parties have limited their activity on policies and
measures to the organization of two information-sharing workshops on "best practices."257 COP-7's decision on this issue
called for further information exchange activities. 258
B. TARGETS AND TIMETABLES: LEADING ... BUT AS A "BUBBLE"

Mter the adoption of the Convention and in the run up to
the fIrst Conference of the Parties scheduled for Berlin in 1995,
it was up to the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS) to
push for additional reduction commitments. It based such a
proposal on the argument that the Convention's stabilization
aim would not be sufficient to tackle the challenge of climate
change and that the fIrst review of the adequacy of commitments under the Convention's Article 4.2(d) should take place
at COP_1.259 AOSIS thus proposed a draft protocol six months
prior to COP-1, which called for a 20% reduction of industrialized countries C02 emissions by 2005. 260 At that stage the EU
had no clear common position with regard to the strengthening
of targets. 261 Germany, however, proposed language that called
for further reductions,262 thereby setting the stage within the
255Id.

See COP·7 Report, supra note 20.
257 The first workshop took place in Denmark in April 2000, and the second workshop in Norway in October 2001. See, respectively, U.N. Doc. FCCC/SBSTAl2000/2; and
FCCC/CP/SBSTAl2001/INF.5.
258 See COP-7 Report, Add. I, supra note 20.
259 See UNFCCC, supra note 5.
260 See OBERTHliR & OTT, supra note 3, at 45.
261 The EU Council of Environmental Ministers of 26.05.1992 had merely indicated a
willingness to "confirm their readiness to contribute actively to preparatory work ...
on the review of developed country Parties commitments, and to the early preparation
of Protocols under the Convention covering specific issues, in particular the limitation
of C02 emissions." Available at: http://www.environment.fgov.belRootltasks/atmos
pherelklim/pub/eulmain_en.htm (visited 12.12.01).
236

262Id.
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ED. At COP-1 Parties concluded that the Convention's aim
was not adequate. They decided to set up the AGBM to
strengthen developed countries' (Annex I) commitments, including by means of "quantified limitation and reduction commitments within specified time-frames, such as 2005, 2010 and
2020 ... "263
Although the ED submitted a "proposal on the structure of
a protocol or another legal instrument,"264 in late 1995, it was
caught in "stymied"265 internal discussions on the relationship
between policies and measures (see previous section) and targets for most of the AGBM. It took a German proposal in October 1995, with the support of a few other Member States, for a
10% reduction of C02 emissions by 2005 and a 15-20% reduction by 2010,266 as well as the D.S. coming forward with its position on targets at COP-2 (1996),267 for the ED to come to an
agreement on a collective proposal in March 1997. This proposal called for developed country's targets and timetables
based on a basket of three gases (carbon dioxide, methane and
nitrous oxide)268 and on a flat rate reduction of 15% by 2010 in
relation to the 1990 base year.269
As stated above, the ED has, during the negotiations of
targets, insisted on being permitted to fulfill its obligations
jointly - or as a ''bubble.'' This means that the EU and its
Member States have a common target (Parties in the end
agreed upon a reduction of 8%), but that they can redistribute
the burden of emissions reductions among themselves by
See Report of COP-I, Decision lICP.1, supra note 23.
See U.N. Doc. FCCC/AGBMl1996/MISC.2, at 18-25.
265 See OBERTHUR & OTT, supra note 3, at 51.
266 The timetables in this proposal had been previously agreed with the EU. Id. at
116. See also U.N. Doc. FCCC/AGBM/1996IMISC.2, at 13-18.
267 At COP-2 the U.S. conceded on taking "binding" targets. See Speech by Timothy
Wirth, Under Secretary of Global Mfairs, as quoted by OBERTHUR & OTT, supra note
3, at 52
268 Whereas other Parties like the U.S. were pushing for comprehensive coverage i.e.
one that included six rather than three GHGs, the EU was patently divided on this
issue. Countries like Germany, France and Austria had favored a partial basket of
gases. The UK and the Netherlands, on the other hand, were in favor of a comprehensive approach. See OBERTHUR & OTT, supra note 3, at 120-126.
269 See 1990th European Council of Environmental Ministers, Brussels, Mar. 3, 1997
[hereinafter March 1997 Council]. The June 1997 Council further proposed a 7.5%
reduction for 2005 for the same basket of gases. See 2017th European Council of Environmental Ministers Luxembourg, 19/20 June 1997. Both docs are also available at:
www.environment.fgov.belRootltasks/atmospherelklimlpub/eu/main_en.htm
(visited
Dec. 10,2001).
263

264
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means of an internal agreement (the "Burden Sharing Agreement;" see below).
Although developing countries supported the EU proposal
on targets,270 this approach drew considerable criticism from
JUSSCANNZ Parties, in particular Japan and Australia, which
considered it "unfair" because it was rooted on the possibility of
internal differentiation (thus flexibility)271 while at the same
time calling for a single target at the international level,272
Nonetheless, Farhana Yamin considers that, despite individual
proposals from Member States, "it was the collective voice of
the EU that forced [JUSSCANNZ] countries to take this target
position seriously" and that it "represented the pinnacle of the
EU leadership" in the Kyoto negotiations. 273
Whereas the EU secured its main objectives of having
binding targets for developed countries alongside with the possibility of it being able to combine its aggregate targets into a
"bubble," on nearly every other issue regarding targets the
EU's preferred proposal was effectively rejected. Except with
regard to the fact that the targets were ultimately differentiated among developed countries 274 (an approach favored e.g. by
Australia),275 and that Parties chose 1990 as the year upon
which reduction should be based276 (a EU preference),277 the
OBERTHUR & OTT, supra note 3, at 118.
France for one favored differentiated targets due to its reliance on nuclear energy
and, consequently, low per capita emissions. See U.N. Doc. FCCC/AGBM/1997IMISC.I,
at 22.
272 See Yamin, supra note 12, at 55; OBERTHUR & OTT, supra note 3, at 116; and
GRUBB ET AL, supra note_11, at 84-86.
273 Yamin, id; and GRUBB ET AL, id. at 87.
274 See Kyoto Protocol, supra note_6, Annex B.
275 The EU spent most if its negotiating time either discussing among itself or talking to the U.S. and Japan. Consequently, it paid less attention to the concerns of countries with Economies in Transition (EITs), in particular those which were deemed to
join the EU in the mid-term. According to OBERTHUR & OTT, supra note 3, at 129-130
" ... there can be little doubt that the Polish and Hungarian commitments [-4%) would
look different if the EU had been more proactive in its diplomatic efforts towards
[those) countries ...."
276 Kyoto Protoccol, supra note_6, Article 3.1.
277 The EU's insistence on 1990 as the base year (although somewhat against the
stated opinion of France), constituted a strategic objective for the EU. A later base
year would have put the EU in disadvantage by rewarding those countries that had not
limited their emissions since the adoption of the UNFCCC in 1992. See GRUBB ET AL,
supra note_11, at 72. However, not all gases covered by the Protocol are subject to the
1990 base year. In fact, Parties "may use" 1995 as the base year for the so-called "industrial gases" (hydrofluorocarbons, perfluorocarbons and sulphur haxafluoride). See
270

271
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bulk of the target's design features were instead U.S. proposals-such as a comprehensive coverage of six gases rather than
three. 278 In addition, there is no interim target for 2005. 279
Furthermore, rather than being based on a single year assessment, the targets are assessed on the basis of a five year 280
''budget'' or "commitment" period commencing in 2008. 281

1. The Burden Sharing Agreement and Article 4 of the
Kyoto Protocol

The issue of ''burden sharing" has been historically at the
center of the EU position on climate change. 282 Already during
the UNFCCC negotiations, the EU had announced it would
implement its commitments jointly.283 However, after the entry into force of the Convention and perhaps because of the
non-binding nature of its stabilization goal, EU climate policy
moved slowly. It was only in the run up to Kyoto, in March
1997, that the EU managed to come to an internal agreement
on burden sharing. 284 Negotiated under the Dutch Presidency,285 this internal agreement contrasted with the EU's own
Kyoto Protocol, supra note_6, Article 3.8. This was mainly to accommodate industrial
bases' concerns in Europe and Japan. See GRUBB ET AL, id., at 75-76.
278 See Kyoto Protocol, supra note_6, Annex A. The wider the coverage of gases the
greater the flexibility in reaching one's target. That is why the U.S. favored a six gas
coverage rather than a 3 gas coverage. By COP-3 the U.S. had also decided to accept
differentiated. See OBERTHUR & OTT, supra note 3, at 119 and 128; and GRUBB ET
AL, id. at 69, 72-76.
279 See Kyoto Protocol, supra note 6, Article 3.2, which merely calls for each Party to
have made by 2005 ".. .demonstrable progress in achieving its commitments under
th[e] Protocol." (emphasis added.)
280 The EU then tried to have it commence in 2003-2007 but it failed.
See
OBERTHUR & OTT, supra note 3, at 126.
281 Kyoto Protocol, supra note_6, Article 3.1.
282 MANNERS, supra note 41.
283 It had· thus interpreted the language in article UNFCCC 4.2(b), supra note, 5,
allowing Parties to meet their commitments "individually of jointly." For an illustration of the EU position on joint fulfilment in the context of the UNFCCC negotiations,
See Daniel Bodansky, The History of the Climate Change Regime, in SPRINZ &
LUTERBACHER, supra note 10, at 33.
284 March 1997 Council, supra note 269.
285 The Burden Sharing Agreement of 1997 was based on a proposal prepared by a
team of researchers from Utrecht University in the Netherlands. See K. Blok, G.J.M.
Phylipsen, and J.W. Bode, The triptique approach: burden differentiation of C02 emission reduction among European Union Member States, Utrecht University, Utrecht,
1997. For a detailed account of the burden sharing negotiations, see Lasse Ringius,
Differentiation, leaders and fairness: negotiating climate commitments in the European
Community, 4 International Negotiation 133-166 (1999).
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proposal of a 15% reduction described above. In fact, the 1997
Burden Sharing Agreement would only accomplish a 9% reduction, with Member States' limitations or reductions ranging
from -25% to +40% (see table 3, below).
It hence came as no surprise that this agreement had to be
renegotiated after the Protocol's adoption, which mandates an
8% reduction for the EC and the Member States. This time
under a British Presidency in 1998, the ED renegotiated the
Burden Sharing Agreement to meet the Kyoto targets, ''but
ultimately the decision was political."286 With the prospect of
locking in specific individual targets, the collective ambition at
COP-3 (1997) gave way to the positions of the more conservative Member States. Indeed, as Oberthiir and Ott summarize
in a characteristic illustration of the relationship between the
Member States in the climate arena:
... [A] number of governments used the new situation to
achieve a general relaxation of their targets. Denmark and
Germany demanded adjustments and the former "green"
countries Austria and the Netherlands admitted that they
would not be able to meet their ambitious targets of the first
agreement. These announcements triggered distinctive resistance from Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain, who were
now expected to limit their emission growth to a larger extent
than formerly agreed. Of the main emitters of the [EU], only
the UK declared that it would take a stronger commitment
than before. 287

Table 3: EU 1997 and 1998 Burden Sharing Agreements
Member State
Austria
Belgium
Denmark
Finland

1997 288

1998 289

-25%
-10%
-25%
0%

-13%
-7.5%
- 21%
0%

See Dessai & Michaelowa, supra note 152.
See OBERTHOR & OTT, supra note 3, at 147.
288 March 1997 Council, supra note 269.
289 2106th European Council of Environmental Ministers, Luxembourg, 16 June
1998.
Available
at:
en.htm
http://www.environment.fgov.belRootltasks/atmospherelklimlpub/eulmain_
(visited October, 1, 2002).
286
287
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Table 3 Continued: EU 1997 and 1998 Burden Sharing
Agreements
Member State

1997

1998

France
Germany
Greece
Ireland
Italy
Luxemboul'g
Netherlands
Portugal
Spain
Sweden
United Kingdom
EUTOTAL

0%
-25%
+30%
+15%
-7%
-30%
-10%
+40%
+17%
+5%
-10%
-9.2%

0%
-21%
+25%
+13%
-6.5%
-28%
-6.0%
+27%
+15%
+4.0%
-12.5%
-8%

The 1998 burden sharing thus settled the scores after
Kyoto and allowed the EC and the Member States to focus on
the development of their own implementation plans, which
have indeed been under way ever since.29o
The issue of burden sharing is intrinsically linked with a
key provision in the Protocol: Article 4, also known as the
"joint fulfillment" provision. This article was established essentially to a~commodate the possibility that the EU and its
Member States would implement their targets jointly or as a
''bubble'' and, as said, constituted a cornerstone of the EU negotiating position. Some commentators have argued that the Article 4 negotiations undercut somewhat the EU's negotiating
positions on other matters, where the EU had to give in so as to
secure agreement on joint fulfillment.291 Another price to pay
290 At the date of this writing virtually every Member State had either adopted its
climate plan, or had developed a first draft of such a plan. See Sebastian Oberthiir &
Dennis Tiinzler, International Regimes as a Trigger of Policy Diffusion: The Development of Climate Policies in the European Union, Annex 1 (Feb. 2002) (manuBcript on
file with Authors). For analyses of several plans, see GUMMER & MORELAND; Broadbent; Dessai & Michaelowa; Eyre; Schleich et aI, all supra note 152. See also links to
Member States' climate web sites at: http://www.europa.eu.intlcommlenviromentlclimatllinks.htm (visited Dec. 10, 2002).
291 See Yamin, supra note 12, at 56-57.
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for this article was that it contains several features that were
not EU proposals. 292 First, it allows for the possibility that
Parties other than the EU (a so-called regional economic and
integration organization-REIO, like the North American Free
Trade Agreement293) may also enter into a bubble agreement. 294
Secondly, the bubble agreement must remain unchanged from
the time of ratification of the Protocol until the end of the
commitment period. 295 Thirdly, and most importantly, the
bubble that will be applicable to the EU contains a provision on
individual and joint responsibility between the REIO and its
members. According to Article 4.6 of the Protocol, "in the event
of failure to achieve the total combined level of emissions reductions,"296 both each non-complying bubble member and the
bubble itself are responsible for such "combined" target.
C. DEVELOPING COUNTRIES

Traditionally, the EU has taken a different approach to
developing country participation in the climate regime, when
compared to other OECD developed countries. Notably, the
U.S. and Australia have argued that the larger developing
countries should take on targets or limitations during the
Kyoto Protocol's first commitment period. This was clearly expressed in the 1997 Byrd-Hagel Resolution by the U.S. Senate,
which required that any agreement signed by the U.S. should
have meaningful participation by key developing counties in

292

For an analysis of the Article 4 negotiations, see Depledge, supra note 78, at 57-

59.
North American Free Trade Agreement Between the Government of the United
States of America, the Government of Canada and the Government of the United Mexican States, Dec. 17, 1992, U.S.-Can-Mex., 32 I.L.M. 605 (1993).
294 See Article 4.1, 2, 3 and 5 of the Kyoto Protocol, supra note 6. However, Parties
new that the EU would be the only REIO using this article in the foreseeable future.
In fact, the EU is the only REIO with at a developed enough stage of integration (far
beyond "economic" in fact) to be able to effectively enforce-via e.g. the European Court
of Justice-the joint responsibility obligation under Article 4 of the Kyoto Protocol.
295 [d. Article 4.2 and 4.3. The EU had proposed that the Burden Sharing Agreement
be changed up until "five years before the expiration of the [commitment] period." This
would have allowed the EU to change the agreement right before the start of the first
commitment period, in 2008, so as to take on board the expcted new Member States of
Central and Eastern Europe. See OBERTHUR & OTT, supra note 3, at 144. See also
Depledge, supra note 78,at 57-59.
296 Emphasis added.
293
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the same commitment period, while not harming the U.S. economy.297
The EU, on the other hand, has taken a much more conciliatory position with respect to developing countries commitments. In the run-up to Kyoto, the EU supported the G77/China's opposition to new commitments for developing countries, in line with the Berlin Mandate in fact. 298 Instead, the
EU argued for a "graduation" - which would include in the
countries taking on commitments those developing countries
that had joined the OECD, like South Korea and Mexico - and
"evolution" - because regulation of developing countries emissions in the long term is an environmental necessity.299 According to Farhana Yamin, the EU was unable to explain their proposals (which were somewhere between the U.S. and its allies
and the G77/China) to developing countries, who rejected them
as soon as they heard mention of new commitments. 30o The EU
proposal for developing countries is fairly consistent with its
own ''bubble'' concept, where more capable states take on
higher emissions cuts (e.g. Germany) while the less developed
(e.g. Spain, Portugal, Greece, and Ireland) are allowed to increase their emissions. In their view, similar principles can be
applied to the climate regime as a whole in the future. Indeed,
the EU bubble will surely bring a good deal of insight into
global burden sharing for future commitment periods.
Mter Kyoto, the EU's relationship with developing countries has been mixed. Sometimes it has supported Umbrella
Group positions, other times G77/China positions, and probably
most of the time somewhere in between. However, after the
U.S. Bush administration rejected further negotiations over the
Kyoto Protocol, the EU speedily arranged support from
G77/China. The EU/G77 coalition was crucial for the success of

297 See Byrd·Hagel Resolution, Expressing the sense of the Senate regarding the
conditions for the United States becoming a signatory to any international agreement
on greenhouse gas emissions under the United Nations Framework Convention on
Climate Change, 105th Congress 1st Session S. RES. 98. (July 25, 1997), available at:
http://www.nationalcenter.orglKyotoSenate.html(visitedDec.10. 2001).
298 See Yamin, supra note 12, at 62-64; and Lacasta & Barata, supra note 11, at 124125.
299 See GRUBB ET AL, supra note 11, at 108-11!'
300 Yamin, supra note 12, at 124-125. Developing Countries fear that the developed
countries might convert the climate change regime into a vehicle that will prevent
them from growing economically.
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the Bonn meeting in the summer of 2001 at COP-5. 301 According to some commentators, Europe has bred a polity that is far
less dominated by the fossil-fuel cartel and far more open to the
logic of a new North/South deal, when compared to the U.S.
This was noticeably apparent when the EU and a few other
developed nations pledged to contribute 0450 million annually
by 2005 (with this level to be reviewed in 2008) for developing
countries climate change activities, while the U.S., Australia
and Japan remained silent. 302
It is important to consider whether this coalition will hold,
strengthen or collapse altogether in the near future. The Marrakech conference already saw some weakening of the coalition,
with the EU caving in to many Umbrella demands, much to the
dislike of G77/China. However, with the discussion on second
commitment period targets nearing, the EU will surely have to
take a leadership and mediating role in order to "keep the family together." This will be one of the biggest challenges the EU
faces in the years to come (see section VII, below).
VI. THE EU AS A LEADER ON CLIMATE CHANGE: ASPIRATION OR
REALISM?

A. OVERVIEW OF EUROPEAN LEADERSHIP PROPOSALS

The sections above have given a mixed picture of the EU's
ability to pursue a leadership role in climate change policy. In
Sections II and III we saw that, despite favorable conditions in
the EU in terms of public and business support, the EU institutional machinery in areas of shared or mixed competence has
constrained the Union's ability to both implement meaningful
domestic policies (section IV) and prepare and present an effective external negotiating position. In Section V we reviewed
the EU's performance on selected issues of the international
climate negotiations. Although by no means exhaustive, such
301 See Tom Athanasiou and Paul Baer, Bonn and Genoa: a tale of two cities and two
movements, Foreign Policy in Focus (Aug. 2001), available at: http://www.foreignpolicyinfocus.org/ (visited 17.11.01). The EU/G77 coalition was unable to break the Umbrella
group though, even with a silent U.S.
302
See Suraje Dessai and Nuno S. Lacasta, The Marrakech Accords:
Saving or Sinking the Kyoto Protocol?, Euronatura Working paper 112002 (unpublished
manuscript on file with authors)[hereinafter Dessai and Lacasta 2002].
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exercises allowed us to realize that the EU can be a powerful
force in the negotiations and that many key elements in the
Kyoto Protocol were either EU proposals or, as a result of EU
positions, were not considerably watered down by others. We
also identified the existence of a paradox according to which
the EU-and several of its Member States-consistently
pushed for progressive elements in the agenda, whereas the
U.S. drove the thinking on the specific elements of the negotiations. As a result, the key architectural elements in the Kyoto
Protocol are all U.S. ideas. In this concluding section we will
review key ways that Europe may continue leading on climate
change, with a view to discerning from recent trends the way
forward.
Among the climate policy literature, two proposals have
emerged on the issue of European leadership. The fIrst proposal was presented in 1999 by two German researchers,
Sebastian Oberthiir and Herman Ott. 303 The second proposal
was headed by Joyeeta Gupta and Michael Grubb in 2000, and
was part of a comprehensive research project on this very subject. 304 Both proposals are complementary and we shall therefore focus on their common elements and apply them to the
practice of the EU for the past year.
These proposals call for a decisive stance from Europe, in
particular but not exclusively the EU,305 on climate change.
They are predicated on the central notion that the U.S. (or others like Japan or the G77) will not exercise leadership, and that
the EU is the only major player with both the will and the capacity to muster the resources to move the process forward.
The key common elements of these proposals are thus:
• Ensuring ratification and entry into force of the Kyoto
Protocol, even without the U.S. initially. The core elements of this strategy include forging a common understanding with Japan and Russia in particular, but also
with other Parties, so as to ensure the majority needed
for the entry into force of the Protocol without the U.S.;306

For a review of this proposal, see OBERTHUR & OTT, supra note 3.
See GUPI'A & GRUBB, supra note 4.
305 OBERTHUR & OTT, supra note 3, at 301, termed it a "leadership initiative."
306 GUPI'A & GRUBB, supra note 4, at 309; and OBERTHUR & OTT, supra note 3, at
303-305.
303
304
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• Implementing domestic policies and measures (at EU and
Member States' levels), so as to lead "by example." In addition to demonstrating that the EU was "putting its
money where its mouth was," this element would arguably pave the way to international coordination of policies
and measures, but this time from a bottom-up process;307
and
• Strengthen relations and common strategies with developing countries. This approach would rely on increased
capacity building support, as well as on ways to ''bridge
the gap between [the developing countries] and the
U.S."308

Gupta and Grubb further add the following elements:
• First, the EU needs to develop a ''better diplomatic modus
operandi to ensure that its total influence is united, flexible, effective and wide in its outreach."309 To that end,
the authors argue, the EU should focus its energies on
devising common implementation and negotiating strategies, whereas their implementation should be left primarily to the Member States. With regard to international
negotiations in particular, the authors recommend that
the EU and the Member States effectively use their impressive combined diplomatic resources. In particular,
Member States should have clearly stated roles, including
greater authority to speak. This fact alone would enhance the projection of the EU's arguments.
• Second, the EU and the Member States need to deploy
comprehensive public education and outreach campaigns.
This is especially relevant in the context of the specific

307 OBERTHUR & OTT, id. at 305·308; and GUPTA & GRUBB, id. Oberthur and Ott
suggest that in the process of building a coalition for entry into force with like· minded
countries, the EU should also coordinate a "limited set of [policies and) measures," such
as in the fields of fiscal policy; research and development on renewables and energy
efficiency; dismantling of perverse subsidies; energy efficiency standards; and public
procurement. Id.
308 GUPTA & GRUBB, id. at 310; and OBERTHUR & OTT, id., at 309-31. See also the
discussion in section V supra on developing countries.
309 GUPTA & GRUBB, id.
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"sacrifices" that will be required in order to implement
domestic policies and measures. 310
Are these proposals, both dating back two or three years,
already outdated by the pace of events? Quite the contrary.
The U.S. pull out of Kyoto only reinforced all the elements in
the leadership proposals reviewed, and during the last year
several-although by no means all-elements of those strategies were clearly visible on the part of the European Union.
The next section presents some examples.

B. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN LIGHT OF THE LEADERSHIP
ELEMENTS: FROM THE HAGUE TO MARRAKECH

Shortly after the U.S. withdrawal from the Protocol, the
EU sent a letter to the White House emphasizing that a global
strategy to tackle climate change is an integral part of its relations with the United States. European Commission President
Romano Prodi and Swedish Prime Minister Goran Persson,
whose country held the EU presidency at the time, signed the
joint letter that challenged the United States to find the "political courage" to come to an agreement on the Protocol's operational rules, at talks due to take place in Bonn in July 2001. 311
A series of transatlantic letters and diplomatic endeavors followed to try to keep the U.S. engaged. 3l2 This shuttling of officials confirmed the rise of climate change as yet another controversial area of transatlantic foreign policy.
As European leaders realized that the U.S. had decisively
disengaged from the international climate talks, EU environment ministers pledged to pursue ratification of the Protocol
with or without the U.S.313 In addition, demonstrating flexibility it had lacked at COP-6,3l4 the EU signaled its willingness to
renegotiate parts of the Protocol in order to accommodate U.S.
at 310.
"EU Tells Bush Climate Is Key to EuropefU.S. Ties," Reuters (Mar. 23, 2001).
312 "Bush Urges U.S. Partnership with EU in Fighting Problem of Global Warming,"
BNA·Intl. Env. Reporter, vol. 24, No.13, at 500 (June 20, 2001).
313 "Kyoto accord may be ratified without U.S. - Germany," Reuters News Service
(Mar. 15, 2001). "'Maybe it will be necessary to ratify the Protocol without the U.S. and
to instead pave the way for them to join later,' Rainer Hinrichs-Rahlwes, director general at the environment ministry told Reuters at a conference in Leipzig."
314 See Grubb & Yamin, supra note 81; and Ott, supra note 54, at 283-84.
31°Id.
311
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concerns,315 but the administration had simply dug itself too
deeply to contemplate any adjustment to its withdrawal. The
EU hence started gathering support for the Kyoto Protocol
around the world. A European delegation visited Moscow, Tehran (Iran led the G77 at the time), Beijing and Tokyo.316
At COP-6.5, in Bonn, the EU showed extensive negotiating
flexibility. As a result, a political agreement (the Bonn Agreement) was brokered among the Parties. 317 According to the EU
the Kyoto Protocol was saved. A bitter sweet feeling was nonetheless evident in some EU quarters as they were reminded
that the terms of the Bonn Agreement are really not so much
. different-perhaps even less stringent in some areas-than the
agreement almost reached at COP-6, at the end of 2000. 318
However, the stakes in 2001 were considerably different than
those of 2000, in that now it was the Protocol's own survival
that was at issue due to the U.S. withdrawal. In that respect,
the EU managed to pull together a coalition of like-minded
countries to secure agreement conducive to the Protocol's entry
into force. That coalition-although at times bitter-persisted
at COP-7, in November 2001. At COP-6.5 and COP-7 the EU
appeared somewhat less under a reclusion mode, having engaged in multiple discussions with third Parties. This may
have resulted in part from the fact that by COP-6.5 and 7 the
EU had well established negotiation positions, or at least the
key principles underlying such positions, therefore allowing it
to reach out to other Parties. It remains to be seen whether
(hat was more the result of a particular Presidency (Belgium at
the time) or the beginning of a change of practice.
VII. CONCLUSION AND OUTLOOK: CAN THE EU LEAD THE WAY
BEYOND THE KYOTO PROTOCOL?

Legge and Egenhofer have labeled this next phase as "the
regionalization of the Kyoto Protocol."319 Just before COP-7,
"EU ready to renegotiate Kyoto," BBC News (Apr. 7, 2001).
"EU to send Delegations to Pacific, Canada on Climate Change; Japan Plans
similar Trip," BNA-Intl. Env. Reporter, supra note 313, at 499.
317 See Decision 5/CP.6, in U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/20011L.7.
318 Concluding in a similar vein, Ott, supra note 54.
319 T. Legge and C. Egenhofer, Mter Marrakech: the regionalisation of the Kyoto
Protocol. CEPS Commentary (2001). Available at: http://www.ceps.be (visited Dec.12,
316
316
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the European Commission adopted a major package of decisions on the ratification of the Kyoto Protocol, the implementation of the European Climate Change Program, and a framework Directive for greenhouse gas emissions trading within the
European Community (see section IV, above). Although this
effort represents considerable progress towards ratification and
implementation, coupled with Member States' own implementation plans, the EU should not be complacent and should
learn from past lessons on domestic policies and measures. The
ratification and implementation processes need to be understood as on-going tasks. With regard to the former, the EU and
its Member States are demonstrating leadership by having
ratified Protocol on time for its entry into force the World Summit on Sustainable Development in the latter half of 2002. 320
EU ratification alone, however, will not ensure that the
Protocol enters into force. As a result, the EU needs to continue pressuring other key Parties to ratify.321
Furthermore, it is essential to bring the U.S. back into the
Kyoto game and the EU must playa key role here. U.S. "freeriding" on climate change raises deeper issues of equity for the
international community as a whole,322 and may increase the
reluctance of developing countries to take mitigation commitments of their own. Climate change is a challenge that is here
to stay-it is a century-scale global commons problem. Having
the world's largest emitter of greenhouse gases outside a global
climate change regime cannot be sustained for a long period of
time. It is therefore essential to re-engage the U.S. on serious
climate talks, using if necessary avenues other than the
UNFCCC. The establishment of a high-level working group at
the EU-U.S. summit in Gothenburg in 2001 may constitute an
initial basis for continued contacts between the two blocs. 323
2001).
320 See March 2002 Environment Council, supra note 72. See also "EU Ministers
Agree to Kyoto Ratification: Some Nations Differ over Emissions Targets," BNA-Intl.
Env. Reporter, vol. 25, No.6, at 257 (Mar. 13, 2002). See also on the EU having ratified
the Kyoto Protocol, EU ratification, supra note 9.
321 A good example came from John Prescott, who urged the world's biggest per
capita emitter, Australia, not to hide behind the U.S. and use this as an excuse not to
do anything. "Australia warned on Kyoto" AAP (Dec. 2001).
322 M.S. Soroos, Global climate change and the futility of the Kyoto process, 1(2)
Global Environmental Politics, 1-9.
323 On Mar. 4 2002, the Environment Council "... confirmed its willingness to pursue
a dialogue with the United States in the framework of the EUlUnited States High
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However, the recent U.S. administration proposal on climate
change represents a set back in terms of its international engagement, as under that plan U.S. emissions are estimated to
grow at business-as-usuallevels. 324 Initial European reactions
indicate clear skepticism from their part.325
The EU seems to be the only Party willing and capable to
bridge the divide between the Umbrella Group and the developing countries. Assuming the Protocol enters into force, as Parties prepare for the negotiations of second commitment period
targets, the strategy of bringing the U.S. on board must be
played in tandem with the negotiation of developing countries'
targets. Some developing countries may be more willing than
others to take on commitments.
Rather ironically, the U.S. withdrawal form the Kyoto Protocol might have contributed significantly to Europe taking the
role of leading the climate change regime into full being. As
the EU continues to assert itself internationally, its responsibility increases accordingly. To seize this opportunity of lead-

Level Group . . ." See March 2002 Council (Authors' translation from the original
French version), supra note 72.
324 See e.g. "Blowing smoke", The Economist (Feb. 16, 2001), at 27-28; and Special
Report: Climate Change," BNA-Intl. Env. Reporter, vol. 25, No.5, at 244-250 (Feb. 27,
2002).
325 Jaume MATAS, Minister for Environment, Spanish Presidency of the EU and
Margot WALLSTROM, Commissioner for Environment, European Commission, Reaction by the European Union to the Speech by President Bush on Climate Change of
Feb. 14, 2002, available at <http://www.europa.eu.intlrapid/startlcgilguesten.ksh?p_
action.gettxt=gt&doc=MEMOI02/33I 0 IRAPID&lg=EN&display=.> (visited Feb. 22,
2001).
It is clear that the proposals for U.S. action on climate change are purely domestic. But
the EU is concerned that they will not even be sufficient to reduce U.S. emissions. The
"intensity target" proposed allows for further increases in absolute emissions and is not
sufficient to fight climate change effectively. In contrast, the Kyoto Protocol requires
most industrialised countries to achieve absolute emission reductions, while they still
expect economic growth.
The March 2002 Council, supra note 72, after approving the ratification of the Kyoto
Protocol by the EC, commented on President Bush's plan as follows (Authors' translation from the original French version)
... The Council ...
- is concerned that the [U.S. President's) proposed measures, which allow for an increase in greenhouse gases at a rate close to the present rate, are insufficient to effectively combat climate change;
- expects all parties to the UNFCCC, including the USA, the leading emitter of greenhouse gases, to assume their responsibilities under the convention, which demands
industrialised countries to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions to 1990 levels ....
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ership, the EU needs to change internal procedures and practices, and engage more widely with third Parties.
It has already been pointed out that the EU needs to lay
more emphasis on timely coalition building, especially with the
group of developing countries. In addition, in order to fulfill
the important leadership functions the EU is called to perform
in the years to come, it will have to improve the internal decision-making process, which has proven inefficient and too
cumbersome for the needs of climate negotiating sessions (see
Sections II, III). Some of the internal issues addressed
throughout this paper include:
• The EU cannot afford paralyzing itself by regular haggling over competences. The EU needs to at least agree
on a common mid and long-term strategy on climate
change, and on a modus operandi for international negotiations, which assigns clear negotiating and decisionmaking powers to the Commission and/or to the Member
States according to their perceived "comparative advantage." These negotiators need to be authorized to act with
flexibility, i.e. to enter into bargaining with third Parties
without being forced to assure consensus among all EU
Member States in the case of each modification to original
agreed EU negotiating positions. Member States must
hence give up some (paralyzing) control in order to ensure
higher overall effectiveness of the EU negotiating practice, which in turn would improve its relationship to negotiating partners.
• Like in other environmental regimes, the Commission
rather than the Presidency should take the lead on climate negotiations. This would not be incompatible with a
clearer division of labor among the Commission and the
Member States described in the preceding bullet, in that
the Commission would work closely with the Member
States in both preparing and negotiating a common position. In fact, such a division of labor would require that
someone ensure the medium and long-term continuity,
stability and consistency of EU negotiating positions.
The Commission seems to be better equipped for that
task in that it is by definition and practice the "guardian
of the Treaties" i.e. of EU policies and regulations.
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• In addition, the EU needs to enter into negotiating sessions with more elaborate positions in order to ensure a
greater impact on the overall design of the regime. It also
and very importantly needs to develop potential fall-back
positions ahead of time to allow for more flexibility and
quick moves in the decisive phases of international bargaining process. As a result, the internal process for
reaching a common position needs to be streamlined by,
for instance, having a system of ''lead countries" to prepare, in close coordination with the Commission, draft
common negotiating positions to be decided by Council.
In fact, some Member States have historically provided
most of the intellectual capital to selected issues, and at
times such a system of lead countries has been adopted
during negotiating sessions. The EU would nonetheless
benefit from having such a practice made more permanent and effective between negotiating sessions .
• Finally, in terms of the specific institutional arrangements within the EU to further this leadership strategy,
the Gupta and Grubb suggestion that climate change
should become part of the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy, thereby greatly enhancing its profile. 326
In conclusion, the ED's main priorities in the mid-Iongterm relate to its ability to (a) implement effective domestic
climate policies-leading by example; (b) reform internal processes so as to ensure it is more capable to lead the international negotiations (e.g. the role of the Commission); and (c)
prepare itself adequately for the second commitment period
negotiations under the Kyoto Protocol (by in particular ''bridging the gap" between the U.S. and the developing countries). If
the EU manages ·to develop more efficient ways to coordinate
its many voices-maybe sometimes even without reaching consensus-, it will be better able to lead the international climate
change process. The analysis of the history of EU climate
change policy, now ten years old, has revealed a mixed record
that, in spite of all its shortcomings, gives rise to guarded optimism for continued international coordination and cooperation on the management of the global commons.
326

GUPTA & GRUBB, supra note 4, at 305.
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